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Trade in manufactures among European Union countries (EU) and between EU and 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) is now essentially free of tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions. One of the most important factor(s) affecting trade between EU 
members and between EU and CEEC countries is the removal (or at least the reduc-
tion) of technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Previous analysis of the completion of the 
Single Market in the existing EU countries suggests that the removal of TBTs may be 
of great significance. The Commission of the European Communities calculated that, 
in 1996, over 79% of intra-EU trade in manufacturing was been affected by harmoni-
zation of technical regulations.  
The main objective of this thesis is to analyze to what extent harmonization of regula-
tions, at the level of the EU, has affected bilateral trade in the manufacturing sector in 
Europe. We distinguish between two types of EU regulations: product-specific regula-
tions and environmental regulations. The basic model is the gravity model of interna-
tional trade with some empirical extensions. 
The thesis is divided in five chapters. In the first chapter, we review the theoretical and 
empirical foundations of the gravity model. This is done in three parts. In the first part, 
we make a brief review on how the gravity equation has been derived within the con-
text of trade theories: Heckscher-Ohlin, monopolistic competition and Ricardian tech-
nologies.  
In the second part of this chapter, we survey some applications of the gravity model. 
Many applications have been carried out such as, analyzing trade preferential agree-
ments, forecasting potential trade between partners, the estimation of interregional and 
international trade (border effects). A special attention is devoted to the application of 
the gravity model in measuring the trade impact of various types of non-tariff barriers.  
Finally, we discuss some econometric issues related to the application of the gravity 
equation. Particular attention is given to panel data sets; the problem of censored data; 
and an application of the gravity model in spatial econometrics.  
Whatever the theoretical framework in support of the gravity model, they all yield a 
similar functional form. Therefore, the best conclusion to be drawn is that of Deardorff 
(1995): “just about any plausible model of trade would yield something very like the  
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gravity model, whose empirical success is therefore not evidence of nothing, but just a 
fact of life”. 
Chapter two examines how harmonization of technical regulations across EU countries 
has affected the pattern of bilateral trade flows of individual EU countries taking into 
account the downward impact of national border on trade flows. 
We first consider some economic and econometric refinements of the gravity model. 
In particular, the model allows for (i) a more flexible income response; (ii) a competi-
tiveness effect that is composed in a general and a specific (i.e. bilateral) component; 
and (iii) a theoretical consistent measure of remoteness. In addition, we also provide 
some deeper insights in the econometric analysis of the gravity model applied to a 
panel dataset. In this chapter, the incidence of harmonization of regulations is con-
structed as a coverage ratio that directly enters the gravity equation. We separate out 
the effect of the harmonization of regulations on trade (of total manufacturing) in the 
case of bilateral imports and domestic trade.  
The results suggest that: (i) the level of border effects is quite robust to our specifica-
tion of the gravity equation when comparing to other EU related literature; (ii) the bor-
der effect has not declined between 1990-1998; (iii) harmonization of technical regu-
lations cannot explain the presence of border effects; and (iv) the impact of harmoni-
zation of regulations is positive on EU imports.  
The third chapter questions whether our results at an aggregated level of the total 
manufacturing sector are the same at a more detailed level. We use the final specifica-
tion adopted from the previous chapter. We disaggregate trade of manufacturing sec-
tors in five types of categories: four categories are matched to the different approaches 
used by the Commission to the removal of such barriers while one category is an ag-
gregate of the sectors where technical barriers to trade are not present. 
Two major results deserved to be emphasized. First, harmonization of regulations can-
not explain differences in border effects between manufacturing sectors regulated by 
harmonization of regulations and manufacturing sectors where technical barriers to 
trade do not apply. Second, we observe significant differences in various coefficients 
of the gravity model applied to trade in the different sub-groups of manufacturing 




factors may explain differences in the level and evolution of border effects within the 
different groups of harmonization approaches. 
Chapter four investigates the link between environmental regulations and exports with 
particular reference to the Single Market and enlargement. We estimate a system of 
simultaneous equations: (i) an export-gravity equation modeling the impact of domes-
tic environmental regulations on exports and (ii) an equation modeling EU harmoniza-
tion of regulations and exports on domestic environmental regulations.  
The second equation is an attempt to answer two questions: (i) whether countries may 
wish to reduce the level of stringency of domestic environmental regulations as a re-
sponse to higher exports - this argument is rooted in the literature of endogenous pro-
tection - and (ii) how national environmental policies and harmonized environmental 
regulations have collided.  
The results find support for the prediction that the level of domestic environmental 
regulations has a large negative effect on exports. The impact of domestic environ-
mental regulations on exports is twice as large when it is treated as an endogenous 
variable. A further issue that emanates from this empirical finding is that more har-
monization (the higher the share of exporting manufacturing sectors that are subject to 
EU environmental regulation) has been accompanied by more stringent domestic envi-
ronmental regulations in CEEC countries and lower levels of domestic environmental 
regulations in EU countries. In addition, we find that countries are unlikely to reduce 
the level of domestic environmental regulations as a response to more exports. 
Chapter five describes the data sources and discusses data methodology that has been 
used in chapter two, three and four. In addition, we present some graphs and tables of 
the data. A particular attention is given to the data on EU harmonization of product and 









A SURVEY OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF THE GRAVITY MODEL 
1. Introduction   
For about forty years, the gravity model of international trade has become the standard 
tool in explaining bilateral trade flows and still remains at the core of empirical re-
search. Specifically applied to international trade, the gravity model predicts that the 
volume of trade between countries should increase with their size (as measured for in-
stance, by GDP) and decrease with transaction costs (typically measured by bilateral 
distance).  
In section 2, we make a brief and synthetic review about the way in which the gravity 
equation has been derived within the context of different trade theories. We also con-
sider some analytical results and empirical work that have evaluated different theoreti-
cal views. Different theories have been developed in support of the gravity model. At 
present, there are three micro-foundation approaches that led to a derivation of the 
gravity model: 
(i)  Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989) and Deardorff (1995) share the view 
that a gravity equation can easily be derived from an Armington model of trade 
of homogenous goods which is driven by differences in factor endowments.  
(ii)  Helpman and Krugman (1985) claim that gravity equations can easily be recon-
ciled from general equilibrium models with monopolistic competition allowing 
for trade of differentiated goods.  
(iii)  Eaton and Kortum (2002) start from a Ricardian model with a continuum of 
goods from which they derive a structure that resembles the gravity model.  
In section 3, we survey some applications of the gravity. The wide range of applica-
tions of gravity equation in trade policy is a perfect illustration of its success in empiri-
cal trade analysis. In general, the main interest lies not in the traditional coefficients 
from the gravity (income, distance) but rather in the coefficients of various forms of 
trade barriers that can be easily appended to the equation. Many applications have been 
carried out such as, analyzing trade preferential agreements, forecasting potential trade  
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between partners and the estimation of interregional trade flows (border effects). A 
special attention has been devoted to the trade impact of various types of non-tariff 
barriers (NTBs). These are explored in the remainder of the section.  
In section 4, we generalize the discussion of the functional form of the gravity equa-
tion and present three major topics that remain at discussion in the econometric analy-
sis of the gravity model namely: (i) the application of the gravity model to panel data 
sets; (ii) dealing with truncated data sets; and (iii) extensions to spatial econometrics.  
2.  Theoretical Foundations of the Gravity Model  
In its earliest form, Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhonen (1963) posited the following 






Y Y A X    =    , (1) 
where Xij are the exports from country i to country j, Yi and Yj are country i and j’s re-
spective national incomes (GDPs), Dij is a measure of the bilateral trade distance be-
tween the two countries and A is a constant. The first justification for the gravity model 
is rooted in physics. This approach appealed to physical laws of gravitation to arrive at 
the conclusion that the flow of goods from country i to country j equal the product of 
the potential trade volumes of the two countries divided by a resistance or distance 
factor.  
Using this framework, Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhonen (1963) did the first economet-
ric studies of trade flows based on the gravity equation.
1 They concluded that incomes 
of trading partners and the distances between them are statistically significant and of 
the expected positive and negative signs, respectively. Regressions of equation (1) in 
logarithms of bilateral trade volumes on the GDP’s of trading partners and the distance 
between them typically yield R
2’s
  « in the range of 0.65 to 0.95 » (Harrigan, 2001). 
This has led many researchers to use variants of the gravity equation as a benchmark 
for the volumes of trade. 
                                                 
1   In this chapter, we limit our discussion to the application of the gravity model to international trade. 
Notwithstanding, the gravity model has also been applied to other domains that have a spatial 
character such as, explaining migration between countries, the demand of a transport mean between 
two points. In section 4.3., we extend this issue and focus on the spatial dimension that can be 
econometrically captured by the gravity model.   
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The gravity equation has been a model in search of a theory. Indeed, it was often criti-
cized because it lacked theoretical foundations. These foundations were subsequently, 
developed by many authors. 
Originally, Anderson (1979) derived a gravity model based on preferences that are 
homothetic and identical across all countries. Assuming that each country specializes 
completely in the production of its own good, the volume of trade of country i to 
country j (Xij) can be presented by: 
  Y X j i ij θ =      , (2) 
where Yj is country’s j income (denoted in real GDP) and θi denotes the fraction of in-
come spent on country i’s products (the share is equal across importers). Since pro-
duction of every country i must equal exports, then:  







ij i Y X Y
1 1

















θ    , (4) 













X = . (5) 
This simple gravity equation is analogous with equation (1) for A=1/Yw and Dij=1. The 
interpretation of equation (5) is that the functional form of the gravity equation is en-
compassed by the expenditure system of the trading partners: the adding-up constraint 
of an expenditure system combined with homothetic preferences, unitary income elas-
ticities and prices are assumed to be constant in all countries.  
Anderson (1979), then, in an appendix, presented a theoretical justification for the 
gravity model based on CES preferences and goods that are differentiated by country 
of origin (the Armington assumption). The author shows that when consumers have  
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both identical homothetic preferences, a sufficient condition for obtaining a gravity 
equation is perfect product specialization in the sense that each commodity is produced 
in one country.  
Bergstrand has explored the theoretical derivation of the gravity equation in a series of 
papers. Bergstrand (1985), like Anderson (1979), used CES preferences over Arming-
ton-differentiated goods to derive a reduced form equation for bilateral trade flows 
from a general equilibrium model. He specified CES preferences with a different elas-
ticity of substitution between imported and domestic goods, on the one hand, and that 
among imports, on the other hand. He demonstrated that a gravity model can be de-
rived from simple assumptions including perfect substitutability of goods across coun-
tries and expands the gravity equation with price indices from the existence of nation-
ally differentiated products. Using GDP deflators to approximate these price indices, 
he estimated his system in order to test this assumption of goods differentiation. Coef-
ficient estimates suggest that elasticities of substitution among imports are higher (ex-
ceeding unity) than between domestic and imported products (below unity) and con-
cludes that imports were closer substitutes for each other than for domestic goods.  
Bergstrand (1989, 1990) extends the theoretical foundation presented in Bergstrand 
(1985) to incorporate factor-endowment variables from the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
and accounts for taste preferences à la Linder who suggested that countries with simi-
lar per capita incomes will have similar demands. He defined demand from a nested 
Cobb-Douglas-CES-Stone-Geary utility function allowing for manufactured goods and 
non-manufactured goods with a minimum consumption requirement of the non-manu-
factured good (common to a Stone-Geary utility function). The supply is defined by 
assuming the Dixit-Stiglitz (1977) monopolistic competition (and therefore product 
differentiation among firms rather than among countries) applied to a two sector econ-
omy allowing for different factor proportions. From his analytical framework, it is 
suggested that a gravity model can be understood from theories of perfect competitive 
Heckscher-Ohlin models applied to inter-industry and monopolistic competition that 
assumes intra-industry trade. In the first paper, Bergstrand used this framework to ob-
tain a version of the gravity equation. In the second paper, Bergstrand elaborated on 
the theoretical propositions that intra-trade industry is promoted by supply (Hecksher-
Ohlin model) and demand considerations (Linder hypothesis of tastes).   
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2.1. Monopolistic  Competition 
Since Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1985, 1989, 1990), it has been increasingly 
recognized that the gravity equation prediction can be derived from very different 
structural models. Bergstrand’s work has been extended in deriving a gravity equation 
from monopolistic competition models of trade. In the monopolistic competition 
model, developed by Helpman-Krugman (1985, section 8.2.), a number of varieties 
interacts with firms who face increasing returns to scale in production. With identical 
homothetic CES preferences on the demand side, strong symmetry assumptions on the 
supply side, and zero transport costs, the result of Helpman-Krugman model is a sim-
ple equation for bilateral trade:  
  X s s X s X wk j i ik j ijk = =    , (6) 
where  X ijk  is country i’s exports of good k to country j; sj  is the share of country j in 
world expenditure,  X wk ; and Xik, is country i’s output of good k equal to GDPi. Sum-
ming over all goods k gives the gravity model of equation (1) for A= 1/ X wk  and 
Dij=1. Equation (6) holds whenever consumers face the same prices and trade is bal-
anced. This implies that the generalization of the gravity equation as shown in (6) 
assumes that country i consumes a fraction si of every good that is produced in the 
world economy in the same way that it exports a fraction 1-si of every good that it pro-
duces, with a fraction sj of its output being exported to country j. In a monopolistic 
competitive, the Helpman-Krugman model predicts that intra-industry trade may exist 
within a group of ‘industrialized countries” as long as complete specialization occurs 
in production. In addition, trade volumes should be related both to the size of the im-
porting country (reflecting demand) and to the exporting country (reflecting the num-
ber of varieties produced). 
2.2. Ricardian  Technology 
In a recent paper, Eaton and Kortum (2002) develop a multi-country perfectly com-
petitive Ricardian model with a continuum of goods from which they derive a structure 
that resembles the gravity model. However, the set of assumptions that are posited by 
the Ricardian model yields different implications from those derived from the Arm-
ington assumption or the monopolistic competition model. Most notably, in the Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) model, it is assumed that more than one country may produce the 
same good while in the cases of Armington or monopolistic competition each country  
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is unique. The novelty of their model is that specialization occurs from comparative 
advantage that is interactively linked to the level of technology and geographic trade 
barriers.  
The foundation of their model is the assumption that country i’s efficiency in produc-




θ − − =e z T z F
i
i
  ) (    , (7) 
where Ti  reflects country i’s absolute level of technology and θ is a parameter that re-
lates to the heterogeneity of goods in countries’ relative efficiency, and hence, 
measures the comparative advantage. A larger value of θ implies lower productivity 
differences across countries. The parameters Ti and θ that are used in a distribution of 
extreme values such as, the Fréchet distribution may not be a plausible representation 
of the real world. Several questions at this point can be raised. First of all, it is ques-
tionable that differences in the level of technology and, hence, comparative advantage 
between developed and developing countries are so large to be presented in such 
framework. Secondly, the distribution is very sensitive to the value of the two pa-
rameters and, finally, it is questionable that such a sophisticated form to present tech-
nologies is needed.  














) (    , (8) 
where τij is the iceberg transport factor between country i and j and the input cost of 
producing good g is ci / zi(g), where country i has wages ci. However, country j will 
only import from country i if pj(g)  is the lowest across all sources i, 
{} N i g p g p ij j ,...., 1 ); ( min ) ( = = , with N is the number of countries. It can then be 
shown (after a few steps) that the price index:  








   , (9) 
                                                 
2   Strictly speaking, it is a simplified version of the so called Type II (or Fréchet) generalized extreme 
value distribution. Typical examples to which such distributions may apply, are tests of financial 
bubbles, predicting rainfall, etc.   
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which is a parameter derived from the probabilistic distribution of prices of country j, 
is conditioned on the technology and input and transportation costs of all countries.
3 
This price index falls as j becomes more isolated from i (as reflected in a higher τij). 
Expression (9) confirms to the general point that relative distance matters for interna-
tional trade. This is an important point to which we return in section 2.4. To link the 









= . (10) 
Expression (10) looks like a gravity equation in that bilateral trade is related to the im-
porter’s total expenditure, Yj and to geographic barriers, τij. In this model, if country i 
has a higher state of technology, lower input costs or lower geographic barriers, more 
goods will be exported to country j. 
2.3.  An Empirical Test of the Gravity Equation  
The gravity equation derived from a monopolistic competition framework gave pre-
diction on intra-industry trade that can be tested using sectoral data on production and 
trade. This is in contrast to the Heckscher-Ohlin model where the gravity equation is 
used to explain inter-industry trade of homogenous goods. In such models, trade is 
driven by differences in factor endowments while in the former, trade of differentiated 
goods is driven by similarities in factor endowments.  
The first formal attempt to provide a link between the gravity equation and monopo-
listic competition came from Helpman (1987). In particular, he tested for the relation-
ship between differences in relative factor endowments and the share of intra-industry 
trade in bilateral trade flows. He used the absolute value of differences in GDP per 
capita as a proxy for differences in factor endowments. For a sample of 14 OECD 
countries, Helpman found that the larger the shares of bilateral intra-industry trade the 
more similar were the countries’ per capita income. He concluded that the empirical 
evidence support the theory.  
Subsequent studies showed, however, that this relationship might not be robust. Hum-
mels and Levinsohn (1995) borrowed Helpman’s equation and fit the same regression 
to a new set of countries that are not all OECD member. They specifically choose 
                                                 
3   Expression (9) is obtained by substituting the expression (8) that solves for pij(g) into the distribution 
defined by (7).  
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countries that they feel do not meet the assumption of monopolistic competition (this 
idea was also made by Deardorff, 1995). Using this new dataset, the regression fitted 
the data quite well when it should not have, given the assumption of monopolistic 
competition. In another exercise, they allow for more realistic trade in an OECD data-
set in which some trade is intra-industry and some is inter-industry. According to their 
regression results, it seemed that intra-industry is more a function of country pair-spe-
cific effects than factor differences.  
Hummels and Levinsohn cast a shadow over the monopolistic competition theory and 
the gravity equation since they find that the theory holds given their hypothesis that 
non-OECD countries do not meet its assumption of monopolistic competition. How-
ever, they did not shut the door on the gravity model. They recognized that assuming 
complete specialization (in either homogenous or differentiated goods) may be prob-
lematic to any theoretical explanation of the gravity model. This is because trade is 
usually an amalgam of both homogenous goods driven by differences in factor en-
dowments and differentiated goods driven by similarities in factor endowments.  
Evenett and Keller (2002) develop a model of intra/inter-industry trade where trade is 
not completely specialized. This is a special case Helpman did not consider, which 
Hummels and Levinsohn suggested may change their evaluation of the monopolistic 
competition. Since intra-industry trade is based on models of imperfect competition, 
this can be interpreted as supporting the view that the gravity model is linked to imper-
fect competition. In particular, they show that the gravity equation works rather better 
between countries for which intra-industry trade is more important. To reach such con-
clusions, their approach is to derive the gravity model from two different theoretical 
views (Heckscher-Ohlin and monopolistic competition) allowing for perfect and im-
perfect specialization and examine whether the gravity works better in sub-samples of 
country pairs that are thought to better fit the presumptions of different models. 
Debate on the issue continues. At the theoretical level, Deardorff (1995) undermines 
the argument of monopolistic competition by showing that the gravity equation can 
easily be motivated in a Heckscher-Ohlin model without assuming product differentia-
tion. He relaxes the assumption that factor prices are equalized between countries so 
that countries specialize in producing different goods. The idea is that in a world with 
transportation costs, the Heckscher-Ohlin model can not have factor price equalization  
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between two trading countries.
4 This highlights the key that countries produce different 
goods (not necessarily different ones); whether they do so because of product differen-
tiation by monopolistic competition or merely because of the Heckscher-Ohlin model 
with perfect specialization.   
So, along these lines, the Heckscher-Ohlin model would be responsible for the 
gravity’s success in explaining inter-industry, bilateral trade flows among countries 
with factor endowment differences and low shares of intra-industry. Whatever the 
theoretical framework in support of the gravity model, they all yield a similar func-
tional form. Therefore, the best conclusion to be drawn is that of Deardorff (1995): 
“just about any plausible model of trade would yield something very like the gravity 
model, whose empirical success is therefore not evidence of nothing, but just a fact of 
life”. 
2.4.  Further Theoretical Considerations of the Gravity Model  
One of the key features in the models of Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985, 1989) 
and Deardorff (1995) is that consumers regard goods as being differentiated by the lo-
cation of production, known as the “Armington assumption” (Armington, 1969). The 
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where Cij is the consumption by country j consumers of goods from country i and σ>0 
is the common elasticity of substitution between any two consumption goods. βi is the 
preference parameter that consumers in each country spend on their incomes on the 
product from country i.
5 An important feature of the gravity equation is that the prefer-
ence parameter is identical and homothetic for all consumers everywhere so that iden-
tical fractions of income are spent by all countries. This makes the derivations of the 
gravity model easily possible. However, homotheticity is an extreme assumption 
which has received regular empirical rejection. As Samuelson and Swamy (1974) note: 
                                                 
4     If they did have factor price equalization, price of goods would be identical and neither country could 
overcome transportation costs.  
5    In a model of monopolistic competition, the parameter βi  can be reinterpreted as the preference 
parameter valuing product variety.  
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“Empirical evidence is abundant that the Santa Claus hypothesis of homothetic-
ity in tastes and in technical change is quite unrealistic. Therefore we must not 
be bemused by the undoubted elegances and richness of the homothetic theory 
… We must accept the sad facts of life and be grateful for the more complicated 
procedures that economic theory devises.”  
Some authors have empirically validated the argument that tastes are non-homothetic. 
Thursby and Thursby (1987) estimate an equation that controls for the usual gravity 
variables (distance, adjacency, GDP’s) and find that countries with similar incomes per 
capita trade more. In a recent paper, Mitra and Trindade (2003) use the gravity equa-
tion and find that the inequality of income distribution matters for trade. In particular, 
the authors augment the gravity equation with an income inequality measure. By spe-
cifically controlling for rich and poor countries, the results suggest, in line of those 
from Thursby and Thursby (1987); that as inequality increases in rich countries, their 
imports increase while imports from poor countries decrease.  
Theoretically, Deardorff (1995) shows that by deviating from the homotheticity as-
sumption and allowing in equilibrium, that each country spends a different share of its 
income on each good, the simple derivation to obtain the gravity equation does not 
work. The main result he obtains from such a deviation of preferences is that two 
countries will not trade in the same proportion as indicated by a simple gravity equa-
tion explained by their incomes along. In essence, if one country produces more what 
another over-consumes then they will trade more intensely.  
Anderson’s and Bergstrand’s models, and most other explanations for the negative ef-
fect of distance on trade, assume that transport costs, τ, are of the “iceberg” form, 
where for every τ > 1 units shipped to from the exporter, only 1 unit arrives at the im-
porter’s location, the other τ-1 units having “melted” in transit. In empirical applica-
tions, it is assumed that all other barriers to trade (e.g. transaction costs, quality of in-
frastructure, tariffs, and non-tariff barriers) are captured by an increasing function of a 
distance-dependent variable which we denote as Dij. This way, the price of any good of 
country i to country j can be decomposed into a product of two terms:  
  D p p ij i ij =    , (12) 
where pi is a f.o.b. price for country i’s exports and Dij is empirically captured by a 
distance-dependent variable that proxies the transportation costs (Dij = τ). The iceberg  
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assumption is crucial in deriving the gravity equation based on preferences given by 
equation (11). Some authors have investigated the relationship between transportation 
costs, the quality of infrastructure and distance. Hummels (1999) uses detailed data on 
freight rates and supports the argument that a relationship exists between geographical 
distance and transportation costs. A number of other authors (Roberts and Tybout, 
1997; Bernard and Jensen, 2004) have shown that there are important fixed costs to 
trade which are independent of distance. Bougheas et al. (1999) predict a positive re-
lationship between the level of infrastructure and trade.   
To solve the model (see Deardorff, 1995), the demand function that arises from (11) is 
given by:  
 
()
                                        ,     








ij  (13) 


























  , (14)   
is a CES index of all landed prices in country j. To get the standard gravity model, the 
model imposes market clearance. The nominal value of exports of country i to country 
j is Xij=pijCij  so that the expenditure of all countries j on goods produced in country i 
are∑ j ij ijC p . Let θi = Yi /Yw be the share of country’s i income in world income, Yw; 
then, Yi=∑ j ij ijC p  and substituting the value of  ij C  from (13) into this expression, 
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Substituting (15) into (13) and using (12), the volume of exports of country i to coun-


























































     with i,j,h = 1, … n. (16) 
Without loss of generality, prices of all goods in the countries of production can be 
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Expression (18) is defined as the bilateral distance weighted by the price index. Sub-































  . (19) 
Expression (19) is the gravity equation for exports of country i to country j and in-
cludes the basic variables income (GDP) and the distance. The term in brackets is the 
relative distance effect or remoteness that has been introduced by Deardorff (1995). 
The gravity equation (19) reduces to the simple gravity equation (1), in the very 
unlikely case, when the term in brackets equals unity. In addition to a CES structure 
and iceberg transportation costs, the development of (19) makes the point that control-
ling for relative distance is crucial to estimating a well-specified gravity model. This 
has led to an important implication for the empirical application of the gravity model. 
We will return to this issue in the next section.   
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3. Empirical  Applications   
3.1. General  Framework 
The theoretical-grounded structure of the gravity models has led many researchers to 
investigate a number of empirical regularities. A general purpose of most of the gravity 
empirical applications is to identify factors that exert a trade-enhancing or trade-re-
ducing effect on volumes. Most commonly, estimated gravity equations take a log-lin-




k ij j i ij Z d y y x ε β β β β α + ∑ + + + + = 3 2 1          with k = 4…K    , (20) 
where xij is the log of exports from country i to country j, yi and yj are the log of the 
GDP of the exporter and the importer, respectively; dij is the log of the bilateral dis-
tance between country i and j; Z
k captures a set of observables, k, to which bilateral 
trade barriers can be related. In equation (20), the dependent variable is expressed in 
the log of exports between two countries. By notation, any variable x is the log of X. 
In many studies, authors prefer to explain imports rather than exports as the dependent 
variable. Indeed, it may well be so that imports are statistically better measured. As we 
will see later, McCallum (1995) uses total trade and in this chapter we will consider 
that mij is identical to mji.  
A common assumption is that distance is also included and is usually measured as the 
great circle distance between capital cities. The subsequent empirical literature enters 
additional observables associated with - geographic variables - common languages, 
common border, so-called remoteness variables which are intended to capture the av-
erage distance of all countries, etc. and - policy variables - different regulations and 
product standards, currency zones, regional integration agreements, etc. Some studies 
also include population in the equation on the ground that as population increases 
faster than income (a decrease in GDP per capita), a country will import less. 
In this section, we explore three applications of the gravity model that are at the fore-
front of recent empirical research in international trade policy linked to trade-enhanc-
ing or trade-reducing effects: (i) the estimation of border effects; (ii) the analysis of 
trade preferential agreements including forecasting potential trade between partners; 
and (iii) the measurement of non-tariff barriers.   
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3.2.   Border Effects and Distance 
3.2.1. Border Effects 
One avenue of this empirical research is to reveal a significant puzzle regarding the 
level of trade. Beginning with McCallum (1995), the gravity model has been used to 
compare intra-national trade between Canadian provinces to international trade be-
tween Canadian provinces and US states. Specifically, the regression estimated by 
McCallum is: 
  ij ij j i ji ij Border d y y x x ε β β β β α + + + + + = + 4 3 2 1 ) (    , (21) 
where Border is a dummy that takes the value of unity for trade within a country; dij is 
the distance between any two provinces or states; and yi and yj are the province or 
state’s GDP’s. The author finds that Canadian provinces are about twenty times more 
likely to trade amongst themselves than they are to trade with US States after control-
ling for size and distance between economic centers. The data set applied by 
McCallum appeared to be unique in identifying trade amongst the regional subsets of 
trading partners. He uses a Statistics Canada dataset for 1988 that consists of imports 
and exports for each pair of provinces as well as between each of the ten provinces and 
each of the 50 US states.  
Notice that the data availability makes it difficult to replicate McCallum’s research for 
other countries. Wei (1996) constructed a ‘border effect’ measure based on a quasi-ac-
counting identity where domestic trade is measured by the difference between domes-
tic production and exports. The effect of crossing a border is captured by including a 
dummy variable.  
Wei (1996) estimated the border effect for OECD countries and finds on average, that 
countries trade 9.6 times more (measured as the antilog of this coefficient) with them-
selves than with foreign countries. This method of constructing an estimate of trade 
within a country that has been initiated by Wei (1996) has subsequently been used in 
many empirical studies. Helliwell (1997) revisits the OECD data and finds a border ef-
fect of 13. Nitsch (2000) is the first paper that constructs a sample for EU countries by 
using a detailed dataset compiled by Eurostat. He finds evidence of a substantial bor-
der effect in Europe, with internal trade being on average larger by a factor of ten than 
trade with other EU partners. In addition, he also finds that the level of the border ef-




Such an application of the gravity model requires a measure of the trading distance 
both between countries and within a country. Originated by Wei (1996) and Helliwell 
(1997, 1998), these authors use for internal distances, one quarter of the distance to the 
nearest neighbor. As noted by Nitsch (2000), this method relies too much on the geog-
raphy of neighboring countries, and too little on the geography of the home country. 
Later studies have tended to move towards measures based on internal distance esti-
mates that combine the theoretical structure of the gravity model with information 
about the distribution of population and economic activity within the country (Helli-
well and Verdier, 2001; Chen, 2004; Nitsch, 2000). 
3.2.3. Remoteness 
Following the work of Deardorff (1995), more recent papers on border effects also im-
prove the basic bilateral gravity model by including distance measures of each coun-
try’s alternative trading partners in addition to bilateral distances (Wei, 1996; Wolf, 
1997; Helliwell 1997, 1998; Nitsch, 2000). This is closely related to equation (18) that 
states that the relative distance of trading partners also have an impact on the volume 
of trade.  
Remoteness of a country is defined as the weighted average distance with all its 
trading partners. A common practice is that the weights are given by the GDP of the 
trading partners, although in Deardorff (1995) distances were weighted by a price in-
dex and according to the same author, remoteness is expressed in relative terms. Origi-
nally, Wei (1996) introduces an empirical approximation of the concept of remoteness 
defined as:  










ik /GDP  D r    (22) 
In this framework, there are two remoteness variables: one for the importer and one for 
the exporter and their values vary from year to year due to changing GDP’s. This vari-
able as we discuss in chapter 2 does raise a series of questions. In particular, it may 
yield to strange interpretations of idiosyncratic shocks in the GDPs of the trading part-
ners and usually the coefficients of both variables have contradicting signs.  
The study of Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) has made a significant contribution in 
modeling alternative trading opportunities using the gravity model. One of the features  
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of their model is the inclusion of the border effect itself in the design of the variable 
measuring alternative trading partners. The authors note that a gravity model implies 
that trade barriers reduce size-adjusted (bilateral) trade between large countries more 
than between small countries, and (correspondingly) raise size-adjusted internal trade 
within small countries more than within large countries. Helliwell (2001, pp. 25) notes 
that this is not important for studies that use internal trade of one of the countries, cou-
pled with bilateral trade between the countries (such as the one that we cite in this sec-
tion), “as long as it is recognized that the border effect being calculated compares the 
intensity in internal and external trade for that country alone”.  
3.3. Regional  Integration 
Another extension of the gravity model is its design to evaluate the impact of regional 
trade agreements (RTAs). These RTAs are generally used as a generic descriptor of a 
range of different forms of integration agreements, including, free trade agreements 
(e.g., NAFTA), custom unions (e.g., MERCOSUR) or a common market (e.g., EU).  
Most gravity analyses of RTA typically add dummy variables in order to assess the 
trade potential associated with integration. The equation below can be considered as a 
‘standard’ gravity equation with dummies so to capture integration effects:  
  ij ij j i ji ij RTA d y y x x ε β β β β α + + + + + = + 4 3 2 1 ) (    , (23) 
where yi, yj, dij are the core variables as defined in equation (20) and RTA is a dummy 
variable taking the value 1 for when two countries in a given pair belong to the same 
regional grouping. In this particular framework, it is assumed that the economic vari-
ables: incomes and distance, define the ‘normal’ level of trade. On the assumption that 
the gravity model is well specified the RTA dummy then, seeks to capture systematic 
deviations from this normal pattern of trade due to RTA membership.  
A fairly common finding in this literature (see Greenaway and Milner, 2002) is that the 
effects of RTAs are positively associated with trade. In this framework, the simple in-
terpretation of positive coefficient, β4, is that intra-regional trade is stimulated by an 
RTA which is not a real surprising result since such agreements are primarily aimed at 
reducing tariff and/or non-tariff barriers. Obviously, when RTAs have a small degree 
of real integration, the coefficient β4 may become insignificant and even take negative 
sign. For example, Hassan (2001) finds negative effects for both ASEAN and SAARC  
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in Asia; Sharma and Chua (2000) reported no RTA effects for ASEAN and nor did 
Soalaga and Winters (2001) for Mercosur.  
Recent work has gone beyond the simple study of examining whether RTAs have a 
positive trade effect. Frankel and Wei (1995) examine the extent to which increasing 
intra-regional trade can be attributed to the RTAs itself or to ‘natural factors’. In other 
words, it is observed that even without the formation of RTAs, countries trade more 
with their neighbors than with countries from which they are far remote. So their idea 
is to estimate the RTA effect after controlling for all ‘natural’ factors related to geo-
graphical clusters.   
The gravity equation that they estimate has the basic form of equation (23) with the 
following RTA dummies: EAEC (East Asia), APEC, EFTA, ANDEAN, MERCOSUR 
and NAFTA. They augment the equation with a number of geographical dummies: (i) 
dummy for ‘adjacency’ to indicate whether two countries share a common land border; 
(ii) a dummy for ‘language’ when both countries speak a common language; (iii) a 
dummy when two countries had colonial links. In addition, they also add GDP per 
capita to capture specialization from the Helpman-Krugman model predicting that as 
countries become more developed, they tend to specialize more and trade more. In or-
der to investigate the extent to which RTAs are influencing trade patterns in contrast to 
some natural determinants, they pursue the idea that by controlling for these dummy 
variables (i-iii) and GDP per capita, the level of intra-regional trade would be due 
solely to these variables unless the RTA dummies would be significant. They found 
significant RTAs in the Latin American and European region while this was not the 
case for the North American and Asian regions.   
Another interesting extension of the RTA gravity literature is to investigate the trade 
potential associated with regional integration. The calculation of trade potentials has 
been mainly applied to trade between EU and CEEC countries. The most cited studies 
are Wang and Winters (1991), Hamilton and Winters (1994), Baldwin (1994) Gros and 
Gonciarz (1996) and Nilsson (2000). In these cited studies, the basic idea is first to es-
timate a gravity model applied to a set of countries that are already integrated in the 
world system, such as OECD or EU countries. The potential volume of trade, for ex-
ample, between CEEC and EU countries is then interpreted as the volume of trade that 
would prevail if trade were explained by the same factors determining trade between 
OECD or EU countries in the model. For example, low ratios of potential to actual  
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CEEC trade with the EU would indicate a high level of integration between EU and 
CEEC countries.  
The findings by Winters (1991) and Hamilton and Winters (1994) suggest that differ-
ences between potential and actual trade for CEEC countries are small. On the con-
trary, Baldwin (1994) predicts that the ratio of potential to actual trade CEEC exports 
to the EU12 varies between 1.2 (Romania) and 5.2 (Bulgaria). Baldwin’s projections 
have been further analyzed in Gros and Gonciarz (1996) and Nilsson (2000). Gros and 
Gonciarz (1996) find that the GDPs of the CEEC countries in Baldwin (1994) are 
overvalued and adjust their own projections for the overvaluation of the GDP figures 
and update the estimated trade potentials of Baldwin (1994) for 1989 with actual data 
for 1992. Nilsson (2000) updates the previous projections of Baldwin (1994) and Gros 
and Gonciarz (1996). Both papers conclude that there is any unused export potential 
from CEEC to EU countries.  
3.4 Currency  Unions 
In line with the regional integration literature, Andrew Rose and a number of co-au-
thors (e.g. Rose, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 2002; Rose and van Wincoop, 2001; Glick 
and Rose, 2002) have attempted to show the impact of currency arrangements on bilat-
eral trade flows using the gravity model. The simple technique is to use a dummy for 
“common currency” in order to capture the impact of currency agreements. The basic 
argument is to consider that currency unions increase trade. This argument is not ex-
plicitly grounded in theory but rather it has an empirical focus. An important issue is 
related to a number of econometric problems (method of estimation, inferences, etc.) 
that may arise. These are quite general and may be applied to the generic estimation of 
the gravity model, which we present in the next section. One should be cautious on the 
interpretation of the results including statistical inferences on potential trade if two 
trading countries are part of a currency union. One particular problem that is specific 
in estimating the impact of currency unions or even a monetary agreement on trade is 
its endogeneity. We return to this in the paragraph below.  
Rose (2000) estimated the effect of currency union membership on international trade. 
Rose exploited a large dataset covering 186 countries from 1970 through 1990 and 
found that bilateral trade was higher for a pair of countries that used the same currency 
than for a pair of countries with their own currency. More precisely, the coefficient on  
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a currency union dummy was found to be positive and significant. Using different 
specifications of the gravity model, its value did not fall below 1.2, implying an effect 
of currency union on trade around 300% (e
1.2)
6. Rose and Glick (2002) extended the 
dataset of Rose (2000) to over 200 countries from 1948 to 1997 and found that a pair 
of countries that joined a currency union experienced a near doubling of bilateral trade.  
In Rose and van Wincoop (2001) and Frankel and Rose (2002), the authors  are not 
simply trying to determine that currency unions may improve trade but also establish 
the argument that currency unions are welfare improving. The basis of this argument is 
simple and follows from an endogeneity issue; namely, that currency unions increase 
trade, and trade increases output and thus welfare. In line with the empirical gravity 
literature, the endogeneity problem between trade and output (GDP) is highlighted. A 
standard technique has become to use instrumental variables since GDP and exports 
are most likely jointly determined in equilibrium (McCallum, 1995; Harrigan, 2001; 
Helliwell, 1997) and in order to deal adequately with this problem, the empirical 
gravity literature uses population as an instrument. However, it is generally noted that 
the lack of instruments does not permit to deal adequately with this problem.  
In this paper, however, the authors go one step further and an interesting approach of 
this work is that they also investigate whether or not currency unions may affect in-
come through other channels than trade. In assessing the impact of currency unions on 
trade and output, Frankel and Rose (2002) use the exogenous regressors of the gravity 
model (distance, population, adjacency, language) to form a predicted variable of 
trade, which is then used as an instrument for a regression where the dependent vari-
able is income. In essence, the income regressor has shifted to the LHS of the equation 
and an instrumented version of trade has shifted to the RHS which is then augmented 
with a dummy for common currency. The main conclusion is that (i) currency unions 
increase trade; and (ii) trade raises income but currency unions do not.  
                                                 
6  This result should be interpreted with some degree of caution. It is implausible to believe that a 
country, for example, like Denmark would triple trade by joining a single currency. The country has 
already established a minimum condition for joining the EU. In addition, in a hypothetical world it is 
plausible that between any countries monetary unions can be formed. However, in reality it is 
unthinkable for some countries to sign a common currency agreement.   
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3.5. Non-Tariff  Barriers 
The gravity model has also been applied for identifying the impact of regulatory policy 
barriers. In this subsection, we will review and evaluate the methodology and results of 
selected studies that have related trade flows to measures of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) 
using gravity-type equation of international trade. Based upon several types of NTBs 
(regulations, standards, technical barriers to trade), we may distinguish the mainstream 
literature into three categories:  
(i)  The studies of Harrigan (1993) and Head and Mayer (2000) use crude indica-
tors of NTBs in investigating its trade impeding effect. The effect of regula-
tions (technical barriers to trade) is implicitly incorporated in the data. 
(ii)  Swann and Temple (1996) and Moenius (1999) discuss the hypothesis that 
country-specific standards act like barriers-to-trade while the bilateral harmoni-
zation of standards promote trade. These papers focus on the trade impact of 
voluntary standards rather than on TBTs (more generally due to data limita-
tions); in particular, they investigate institutional standards that are produced 
by the coordinated efforts of standard setting bodies. 
(iii)  Otskuki et al. (2000) suggest that technical regulations in developed countries 
constitute a considerable obstacle to exports of developing countries and collect 
data that precisely investigate the impact of European harmonization of afla-
toxin standards on food sectors. 
3.5.1. Summary of Studies 
Harrigan (1993) derives a gravity equation based on a monopolistic competition model 
and regress, for 1983, cross-country trade flows on trade barriers and production. The 
data on bilateral trade flows between 13 OECD countries is applied to twenty-eight 3-
digit industries. The data on trade barriers come from a comprehensive inventory of 
NTBs from the United Nations Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 
These data consist of indicator variables of about 20 different types of NTBs. To con-
struct the NTBs variables, coverage ratios for each type of NTB were measured by the 
percentage of imports covered by one or more NTB. These various categories of NTBs 
were then aggregated into three broad categories of price, quantity, and threat meas-
ures (e.g., price monitoring).   
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Harrigan (1993) estimates the share of bilateral imports weighted by the GNP of the 
importing country on the three broad categories of NTBs, the partner’s country pro-
duction in industry, average tariffs and a freight factor. The author found that only five 
industries have estimated price NTB effects that are negative while three effects are 
positive and the rest of the estimated effect were not significant. Quantity NTB effects 
were reliably negative while most of the estimated threat NTB effects are not statisti-
cally significant. The author concluded that a great heterogeneity across industries ex-
ists and concluded that tariffs and transport costs were a more substantial barrier to 
trade in manufactures between developed countries than were non-tariff barriers.  
When deriving a gravity model from a monopolistic competition framework, a series 
of (likely unrealistic) assumptions are being made. The author tests two restrictions: (i) 
homotheticity implying that the elasticity of imports with respect to production should 
be unity; and (ii) tariffs and transport costs should be the same in both directions be-
tween countries. These restrictions were rejected at most of the cases. However, the 
reported results suggest that caution should be made in the interpretation. The author’s 
work has thus reflected another possible drawback from using the gravity model since 
differences between theoretical abstraction and empirics suggest that a regression 
model may suffer from unrealistic hypotheses and may only reflect such discrepancy 
and not the real impact of NTBs.  
Head and Mayer (2000) apply a gravity approach to 3-digit NACE data for EU coun-
tries and assess whether there is any correlation between the estimated border effect 
and two indirect measures of EU non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The first measure is based 
on a 1980s survey of EU firms conducted by the European Commission. From this 
survey, the authors construct three variables representing the stringency of NTBs in 
terms of standard differences, public procurement and customs formalities. The second 
set of indicators comes from Buigues et al. (1990) which classified European indus-
tries into three levels of barriers: low, moderate, and high.  
To evaluate the extent that NTBs can account for border effects, the authors firstly es-
timated the border effect at industry level, using a derived gravity equation from a mo-
nopolistic competition model. The industry-level border effects were then regressed on 
the two measures of NTBs. The authors found that NTBs explain at most 10 percent of 
the variation in border effects and that the effects are often insignificant. The study 
concludes that the indicator of non-tariff barriers before and during the Single Market  
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Program cannot explain the variation in the size of estimated border effects and conse-
quently suggest that consumer preferences may be an explanation for border effects. 
Swann and Temple (1996) present an econometric analysis of the effect of standards 
on UK trade performance, using trade for eighty-three 3-digit SIC manufacturing 
codes over the period 1985-1991. Counts of the number of German and UK standards 
by industry were taken from the Perinorm database.  
A distinction was made between internationally equivalent standards where the na-
tional standard was found to be identical to an international standard and national stan-
dards where it was not. The count measures of standards assume that all standards 
have equal weights across industries and that different standards would impose identi-
cal economic effects.  
Swann and Temple (1996) estimated three panel models: a British net export, export 
and import equation on stocks of British and German national and international stan-
dards. In these trade equations, the other explanatory variables are relative export and 
import prices applied to manufacturing sectors and total manufacturing, the volume of 
exports, the volume of imports and fixed industry effects.  
The authors found that British national standards raise imports and exports with an 
elasticity of 0.34 and 0.48, respectively. The coefficients of UK international standards 
in both equations are positive, though not significantly different from zero. The impact 
of German standards on British imports were positive but had a negative effect on 
British exports. The authors then concluded that UK standards appear to increase UK 
exports and imports. The authors suggested that the imposition of British national 
standards convey the message of quality abroad which may explain the increase in ex-
ports while the positive effect of imports may be attributed to higher costs for domestic 
producers. In addition, they suggested that the negative impact of German standards on 
British exports could be explained by a protective impact. Note that these two findings 
are inconsistent and the authors did not elaborate on this. They further concluded that 
UK national standards appear to have a stronger effect than international standards. 
The results are not based on any theoretical model and are derived from empirical evi-
dence. This raises some questions. It is plausible to suggest in a panel framework that 
the effect of national standards change over time? In the context of EU harmonization 
of standards, do national standards between EU countries differ between countries?   
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Moenius (1999) advanced this approach by incorporating standards count data from 
Perinorm for 12 countries and 471 4-digit industries from the Standard International 
Trade Classification (SITC) into a gravity-based analysis of bilateral trade volumes 
over the period 1980-1995. The author also distinguishes between country-specific 
standards, measured by the number of documents specifying a technical requirement 
within a country, and bilateral shared standards, measured by the number of documents 
linked between two countries covering the same code. The number of links is then 
counted as the number of standards.   
Moenius (1999) regress bilateral trade volumes on counts of shared standards and a set 
of dummy variables that control for country-pair effects (intended to capture for in-
stance, income and distance) and yearly-time effects. He finds that one percent in-
crease in the number of shared standards increases bilateral trade volumes by one-third 
of a percent. Using the same gravity specification, but adding a lagged dependent vari-
able to control for first-order autoregressive errors, yields similar results. The author, 
then, concludes that shared standards can play a significant role in promoting trade.  
The impact of country-specific standards is even more intriguing. In a second exercise, 
the author regress import volumes on the same variables but included the number of 
the importing and exporting country-specific standards as additional explanatory vari-
ables. The result is that country-specific standards in importing countries promote 
trade, as do country-specific standards of the exporting country. By repeating the same 
exercise for one-digit industries, the author finds that importing country-specific stan-
dards promote trade in manufacturing but hinder trade in non-manufacturing, such as 
agriculture. 
In the food and agricultural sector, Otskuki et al. (2000) suggest that technical regula-
tions in developed countries constitute a considerable obstacle to exports of developing 
countries. The authors used the gravity equation method to determine the effect of 
European harmonization of aflatoxin standards on African exports
7. They estimate the 
exports, between 1989-1998, of cereals and fruits from 9 African countries to the 
EU15: using both countries’ GDP’s, their bilateral distance, a dummy for colonial ties, 
                                                 
7   Aflatoxins are a group of structurally related toxic compounds which contaminate certain foods and 
result in the production of acute liver carcinogens in the human body. The harmonization of this 
particular standard was to implement a uniform standard for total aflatoxins setting the acceptable 
level of the contaminant in certain foodstuff.   
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fixed time-effects and exporting country-effects. Standards enter directly the equation 
and are measured as the maximum aflatoxin level imposed on imports of food products 
by the EU countries. This data is obtained from a FAO survey of mycotoxin standards 
and from an EU Directive.   
The results show that new (and more stringent) EU standards are likely to be a major 
barrier to African exports of dried fruits and nuts: it implies that a 10 percent tighten-
ing of aflatoxin standards will reduce African exports by 14.3 percent for cereals and 
3% for dried fruits.  
The authors went one step further and also provide results on how trade flows between 
Africa and Europe would have been under conditions in which an existing less strin-
gent standard (indicated by guidelines set by CODEX) would have been imposed. The 
results still reveal that the Commission’s standard will impose far greater trade im-
pediments when comparing trade under international standards for cereals and dried 
fruits. This extended exercise reveals an interesting result since they not only report the 
trade implications under an observable standard but also with comparables in order to 
obtain a real measure of the quantity reduction of the EU harmonization of aflatoxin 
standards on exports. Perhaps a problem in the estimation of African trade to the EU is 
the failure to allow for institutional or local factors that typically channel African ex-
ports. It is known that African exporters are comprised of large international compa-
nies. Such companies may find it easier to adjust their exporters conforming EU stan-
dards compared to small scale African companies. By not taking into account factors 
that are related to the source of exporters, the reported results on technical barriers to 
trade may be overstated.  
4.  The Econometrics of the Gravity Model  
Research has also made progress in the econometric issues in estimating the gravity 
model. However, it must be noted that this literature is still in an early stage. Perhaps, 
because the empirical success of the gravity model is usually expressed on the basis of 
the goodness of fit, this has led to a lack of attention on the econometric analysis of the 
model. In this section, we present three major topics that remain at discussion in the 
econometric analysis of the gravity model: (i) the application of the gravity model ap-
plied to panel data sets; (ii) dealing with truncated data sets; and (iii) extensions to 
spatial econometrics. We provide a brief overview of each topic.   
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4.1  Log-linear and Zero Gravity  
A common consensus among researchers is that the log-linear form of the gravity 
equation is the correct specification. This has an important implication since the mi-
croeconomic foundation of the gravity model is directed towards the application of a 
log-linear functional form. Sanso et al. (1993) have questioned the log-linearity of the 
gravity equation. Using data for 16 OECD countries from 1964 to 1987, they modify 
the gravity equation in a generalized functional form defined by a Box-Cox transfor-
mation which is then estimated for each year separately. The authors’ question whether 
or not a permanent structure would exist for the entire sample. They find evidence that 
a unique functional form exists since the Box-Cox transformation shows a stable 
evolution through time. The authors conclude that the log-linear specification, 
although not optimal, represents the best functional form among those tested.  
Log-linear gravity equations are used in almost all empirical applications; however, a 
problem of log-linearity is that it is incompatible in cases where trade between coun-
tries is zero. Since the gravity model usually uses a large sample of countries and 
years, it is very likely that for some observations trade assumes the value of zero, in 
which case the logarithmic transformation is not possible. There are several reasons for 
observing pairs of countries with zero trade. Two countries may not trade because they 
are small, distant, or both; or other factors such as large costs (e.g., information on for-
eign markets, tariff and non-tariff barriers, transportation costs, etc.) may hinder trade. 
Other reasons for zero trade may be due to the data collection itself (see Feenstra et al., 
1997 for a careful discussion on international trade data issues and treatments). For ex-
ample, zeros may be the result of rounding errors. If trade is measured in thousands of 
dollars, it is possible that for pairs of countries for which bilateral trade did not reach a 
minimum value, the value of trade is registered as zero. The zeros could also have 
been wrongly recorded as missing values or the trade data can suffer from many other 
forms of errors depending on the quality of the data itself (Feenstra et al., 1997).  
The literature has adopted a number of procedures to deal with this problem (see 
Frankel, 1997, for a description of the various procedures). The first has been to omit 
zero value bilateral flows (e.g., Wang and Winters, 1991; Frankel and Wei, 1993). 
This approach of truncating the sample is clearly not the most appropriate since it dis-
regards important information about why low levels of trade occur and may lead to in-
consistent estimates. As argued by Coe and Hoffmaister (1998: pp.10), “omitting these  
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observations represent a non-random screening of the data that may lead to biased or 
inconsistent estimates”. According to Greene (1981), the size of the bias is inversely 
proportional to the share of the sample included in the regression. Thus, the smaller the 
share of observations included in the sample the greater the bias. The second option 
has been to substitute the value of zero for small values, such as 0.001, before taking 
the logs, instead of simply discarding these observations (e.g., Linnemann, 1966). This 
ad hoc procedure allows estimation of the model through OLS since the values of the 
log of the dependent variable are definite. The problem is that the log of a very small 
number is a very large negative number, and as the OLS technique gives larger 
weights to extreme values, these observations would receive a weight that is too large 
in the estimates (Frankel, 1997). A third approach directly addresses the censored data 
for the endogenous variable by employing the Tobit model (e.g., Soloaga and Winters, 
2001). This procedure implicitly incorporates information in the zero observations, 
with the positive observations being used to estimate the value of trade, given the trade 
is positive, while the observations at zero are used to estimate the probability that trade 
is positive.  
Although the use of Tobit seems to be the most popular method for researchers dealing 
with the presence of censored data, recent work of Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2003) 
have proposed an alternative solution to estimating (Tobit, OLS) the log-linear form of 
the gravity model in the presence of censored data. In addition, this method also deals 
with the strong presumption that errors are heteroscedastic and biased. Hence, a non-
linear method is called for, and these authors propose a simple pseudo-maximum like-
lihood approach that performs well in Monte Carlo experiments. To see how this 
works in a more general interpretation, consider the following stochastic model, 
yi=exp(xiβ)ηi, the procedure recommended, by Santos-Silva and Tenreyro estimates 
the β by solving the set of equations Σi(yi - exp(xiβ)ηi = 0. The key issue is that they as-
sume that the errors follow a generalized Poisson distribution - with the variance equal 
to the conditional expectation of the dependent variable - where 
Var(yi|x)=E(yi|x)=exp(xiβ). In contrast, the authors show that a more standard non-lin-
ear estimation in the presence of zero trade may be inefficient since it gives more 
weight to observations with a high conditional expectation for the dependent variable. 
Since high values for the dependent variable are typically associated with high vari-
ance, this is equivalent to giving more weight to more noisy variables.   
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4.2.  Panel Estimation   
Deeper insights in the proper econometric analysis have advocated for panel econo-
metric methods. This is because, instead of testing a cross-section model for all im-
porting and exporting countries at one point in time, a pooled model is tested for all 
importing and exporting countries through time. The pooled analysis then concerns the 
possibility to capture the variation between three dimensions simultaneously: a two 
dimensional effect between importing and exporting countries and a time dimension. 
In a series of papers, Mátyás (1997, 1998), Egger (2000, 2001), and Cheng and Wall 
(1999) have used the advantages of panel techniques to test the trade determinants 
using the gravity equation. Mátyás (1997) validated the evidence that the correct 
gravity specification is a three-way model using importing, exporting and time effects, 
which can then be estimated by a fixed or random effect model. A general form of 




ijt k jt it t j i ijt d y y λ   ν η x ε β β β + ∑ + + + + + = 2 1 , (24) 
where ηi is the exporting country effect, νj is the importing country effect and λt are the 
time-specific effects attributed to the panel data modeling. If only cross-section data 
are used, λt=0 and when only time series data are used, ηi =νj =0. The author then goes 
on to show how the specific effects turn out to be significant in the empirical analysis.  
However, it is not clear whether one should apply a random or a fixed effects model. 
Mátyás (1997) assumed the effects were observable from the data and therefore 
adopted a fixed effect approach. In Mátyás (1998), it is noted that when the number of 
countries in a dataset is large, a random effect approach should be performed. However 
choosing between random or fixed effects seems to be more open to a subjective 
nature, Mátyás (1998) notes “… if one is specifically interested in the “openness” of 
economies, a fixed effect should be used …for strictly more policy reasons, the ran-
dom effect may be preferred …”. Egger (2000) shows, using a similar panel specifica-
tion, that the random effect is strongly rejected in favor of a fixed effect by a Hausman 
specification test. More recently, Egger (2001) demonstrates that due to a possible cor-
relation of individual effects with the explanatory variables, a Hausman-Taylor (1981) 
model is the correct answer to the specification question. Here the specific effects are 
treated as random and represented by an interaction term ωij rather than ηi + νj. This 
approach has two advantages: (i) using a random effect allows for time-invariant vari- 
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ables not subsumed in the specific effects and (ii) the Hausman-Taylor (1981) ap-
proach overcomes the correlation between the ωij and any of the explanatory variables.    
Cheng and Wall (2002) continue the debate on the empirical estimation of the gravity 
model and find evidence that the gravity model tends to overestimate trade between 
low-trade countries, and underestimate it between high-trade countries. They argue 
that the gravity specification should account for the pair-wise heterogeneity of bilateral 
trade relationships. In particular, they augment the gravity model for a country pair 
with a unique intercept, αij, which is different for each direction of trade (αij=αji). The 
other variables include a time dummy, the GDP’s and population of the importing and 
exporting country. They estimate this model using fixed effects and assume that all 
time-independent variables (distance, language and adjacency) and other omitted vari-
ables are absorbed in the country-pair intercepts. Their model is statistically supported: 
(i) the likelihood ratio with and without the trading-pair heterogeneity reject the null 
that the two models are the same; and (ii) there is no obvious correlation between 
residuals and the log of exports. 
However, one might argue that important determinants of trade (distance, adjacency, 
language) subsumed into country-pair effects are hidden from the analysis. They 
counter this argument by regressing the country-pair effect on distance, adjacency and 
language. The results reveal that only the distance effect is a statistically significant 
determinant of the country-pair effects. However, given a low fit (0.04) they conclude 
that very little of the country-pair effects are explained by these variables. 
4.3.  Extensions of Spatial Econometrics to the Gravity Model   
The general condition that determines gravity model (1) is that the volume between 
two areas is directly proportional to the relative attractiveness of each area and in-
versely proportional to some function of the geographic separation of these areas. The 
gravity model of international trade typically assumes that these areas are defined as 
countries, regions, etc. while the geographic distance is assumed to be a convenient 
empirical approximation for transportation costs. In addition, the measurement of re-
moteness also suggests that alternative distance matters. However, in the gravity lit-
erature applied to international trade, little attention has been devoted to a spatial di-
mension that defines the attractiveness of a country.    
 
33
Most relevant to the idea that a spatial dimension is accompanied with the attractive-
ness of a country is the above mentioned paper of Bougheas et al. (1999). The authors 
introduce infrastructure in the bilateral trade model and show that location and en-
dowment play a significant role in determining bilateral trade. In such a model, trade 
depends on the development or investment of transport cost reducing infrastructure. In 
such a framework, the location of the investing country is crucial in determining trade 
opportunities with other countries.
8 
Porojan (2001) applies already developed tools in spatial econometrics to a gravity 
model of international trade. The basic idea put forward is to infer from the residuals, 
spatial features that would characterize trade flows. In essence, the error term from the 
general gravity equation (20) is transformed into a general form that accounts for re-
sidual autocorrelation, written as:  
  ν ε λ ε + = W    , (25) 
where the null hypothesis is that λ = 0. If this hypothesis is rejected this implies that 
the volume of trade flows in/from a region affects the size of trade flow in/from the 
neighboring regions (countries) only if trade is above that considered “normal” by the 
model (Porojan, 2001). The W is defined as a weighting matrix that is intended to 
capture the “degree of potential interaction” between neighboring locations. In Porojan 
(2001) this matrix is defined as a dummy for two countries sharing a same land border 
or a small water border. In essence, this matrix can be defined in many ways. This ba-
sic formulation of the error term captures two types of information: similarity among 
attributes and similarity of location (Porojan, 2001).  
5. Conclusion 
The general conclusion of this survey is that there has been continuing progress both in 
the underlying theory and the estimation of the gravity model. We have seen that the 
gravity model can be understood from various foundations. This makes it difficult to 
select one theoretical model that really helps us to understand the gravity equation. As 
a result, conditions needed to integrate the gravity equations are mixed, estimating 
                                                 
8   The fact that localization matters has become an important issue in the economic geography literature. 
The idea is that firms choose its location so to minimize transportation costs and essentially in such 
models, the location of markets influences profits of firms which determine the size and the 
attractiveness of an area.  
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functional forms are sometimes a-theoretical or econometric suggestions are mixed. 
However, it is a fact that the gravity model works and fits the data well. Perhaps, it is 
more to a challenge to find a theory that yields exactly to a gravity form than the other 
way around.  
Empirical research linked to the gravity model has renewed trade analysis by explain-
ing the importance of various trade determinants in addition to the core variables of in-
come and distance. Indeed, the composition of trade whether intra or inter-industry as 
well the direction of trade whether between developing, developed or a combination of 






AN EXTENDED VERSION OF THE GRAVITY MODEL APPLIED TO 
INTRA-EUROPEAN TRADE OF MANUFACTURING GOODS 
1. Introduction 
A number of recent econometric studies based on a gravity equation have found evi-
dence that the downward impact of excessive intra-national trade (border effect) has 
become an important feature characterizing the international exchange between coun-
tries. McCallum (1995) and Helliwell (1996, 1997, 1998) find that Canadian provinces 
are about twenty times more likely to trade amongst themselves than they are to trade 
with US States after controlling for size and distance between economic centers. Wei 
(1996) introduces a methodology that ruled out the reliance on national trade data and 
finds on average, that countries trade ten times more with themselves than with foreign 
countries. Nitsch (2000) finds evidence of a substantial border effect in Europe, with 
internal trade being on average larger by a factor of ten than trade with other EU part-
ners and that the magnitude of the border effect declined during the 1980’s.  
In this paper, we re-examine the evolution of the border effects (home bias) within in-
tra-European trade. We start from the standard gravity model and consider several 
methodological issues both from an economic and econometric point of view. This 
yields a specification that allows for a more flexible income response, a competitive-
ness effect, that distinguishes a general and a specific component, and an alternative 
measure of remoteness. Next, a special attention is given to the effect of EU harmoni-
zation of technical regulations on trade in manufacturing goods.   
The data on technical regulations come from the Commission’s review of the impact 
of the Single Market in the EU (CEC, 1998). This study provides information at the 3-
digit level of the NACE classification of whether trade is affected by technical regula-
tions and the dominant approach used by the Commission to the removal of such barri-
                                                 
This chapter is written jointly with Daniel Weiserbs. We would like to thank Vitor Trindade and Volker 
Nitsch for commenting an earlier version of this paper and seminar participants at the 2003 Midwest 





ers in the EU. In the appendix and further in chapter 5, we discuss the data that has 
been used in this chapter.  
The paper continues in section 2 with a brief survey of the literature on the gravity 
model. Section 3 presents the standard specification of the gravity model. Section 4 
provides some preliminary results. In section 5 we propose several modifications and 
extensions to the standard model. Section 6 is devoted to further econometric consid-
erations. Our results are presented in section 7 while section 8 threats the impact of the 
harmonization of regulations at an aggregate level of manufacturing. 
2.  Brief Survey of the Literature 
Since the pioneering work of Tinbergen (1962) and Pöyhonen (1963), the gravity 
model has become the standard tool to study bilateral trade.
1 Typically in a log-linear 
form, the model considers that the volume of trade between two countries is promoted 
by their economic size (income) and constrained by their geographic distances. Other 
characteristics of countries can easily be added. For example, Frankel et al. (1995) add 
dummy variables for common language and common border. Deardorff (1995) argue 
that the relative distance of trading partners should also have an impact on the volume 
of trade. Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997) extend this concept and define ‘remoteness 
variable’ that captures third country effects. Whether and how remoteness should be 
included in the model has been discussed later on by Helliwell (2001) and Anderson 
and van Wincoop (2003). 
Although its empirical success can be attributed from the model’s consistently high 
statistical fit, it was also criticized because it lacked a theoretical foundation. These 
foundations were subsequently developed by many authors. Anderson (1979) pre-
sented a theoretical justification for the gravity model based on CES preferences with 
differentiated goods (Armington). Bergstrand (1985, 1989) uses also CES preferences 
to derive a reduced form equation for bilateral trade flows from a general equilibrium 
model. Helpman-Krugman (1985) derives a gravity equation from a monopolistic 
competition framework. Their model predicts that intra-industry may exist within a 
                                                 
1   Alternative approaches such as a complete demand system by country à la Barten et al. (1976) were 
never popular. It is worth wile noticing that we checked a specification in shares allowing for quasi-
homothetic preferences rather than in logs but this was statistically rejected with respect to the 
conventional log-linear form.   
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group of ‘industrialized countries” as long as complete specialization occurs. On the 
other hand, Deardorff (1995) undermines the argument of monopolistic competition by 
showing that the gravity equation can easily be motivated in a Heckscher-Ohlin model 
without assuming product differentiation. He relaxes the assumption that factor prices 
are equalized between countries, so that countries specialize in producing different 
goods. In a recent paper, Eaton and Kortum (2002) develop a multi-country perfectly 
competitive Ricardian model with a continuum of goods from which they derive a 
structure that resembles the gravity model. In their model, specialization occurs from 
comparative advantage that is interactively linked to the level of technology and geo-
graphic trade barriers.  
Whatever the theoretical framework in support of the gravity model, they all yield a 
similar functional form. Therefore, the best conclusion to be drawn is that of Deardorff 
(1995):“just about any plausible model of trade would yield something very like the 
gravity model, whose empirical success is therefore not evidence of nothing, but just a 
fact of life”. 
3.  The Standard Gravity Model and Border Effects 
Typically, the gravity model has the form:  
 m ijt = α + β1yit + β2yjt + δdij+ Z’θ + εijt   ,  (1) 
with time, t = 1, … T: mij is the volume of imports by country i from country j; yi and yj 
are the logs of real income (GDP) of country i and country j respectively; dij is the dis-
tance between the trading centers of the two countries; Z’ is a set of characteristics 
that, (amongst others) include the border and remoteness effects; εijt defines the error 
term (further discussed in section 3.5). All variables but dummies, are expressed in 
logarithm and by notation any variable x is the log of X.  
3.1. Border  Effects 
Beginning with McCallum (1995), the gravity model has been used to compare do-
mestic trade with international trade. Using 1988 data, McCallum finds that Canadian 
provinces are about 20 times more likely to trade amongst themselves than they are to 
trade with US states after controlling for size and distance between economic centers. 
However, data limitation makes it impossible to replicate McCallum’s research for the 
EU. We follow the methodology introduced by Wei (1996) which avoids the reliance  
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on national trade data. He constructs a “border effect” measure based upon the defini-
tion that what a country imports to itself is the difference between domestic production 
and exports. The border effect is then estimated by including a dummy variable. Wei 
(1996) estimated the border effect for OECD countries and finds, on average, that 
countries trade 10 times more with themselves than with foreign countries. This 
method has subsequently been used in several empirical studies. Helliwell (1997) re-
visits the OECD data and finds a border effect of 13 separating out the effect of lan-
guage from the land border effect. Nitsch (2000) finds evidence of substantial home 
bias in Europe, with domestic trade being on average larger by a factor of 16 than trade 
with other EU partners. His results also suggest that the magnitude of the border effect 
declined during the 1980s.  
3.2. Internal  Distances 
The application of a gravity model requires a measure of the trading distances within a 
country itself. Wei (1996) and Helliwell (1997, 1998) use for internal distances one 
quarter of the distance to the nearest neighbor. As noted by Nitsch (2000), this method 
relies too much on the geography of neighboring countries and too little on the geogra-
phy of the home country. He shows that the radius of a circle or 0.56 times the square 
root of the area may be a good approximation for the average distance. In the present 
study, we follow Nitsch’s method. Helliwell and Verdier (2001) move towards a 
measure of internal distances that incorporates information about the distribution of 
population within a country. Nitsch (2000) applies their method to Canada and obtains 
a scaling factor of 0.5 that is very close to his own method of using 0.56. One should 
be aware that the magnitude of the border effect is sensitive to the assumption about 
internal distances. More precisely, any measure that monotonically increases internal 
distance also increases the border effect.  
3.3. Remoteness 
A measure of “remoteness” is now commonly included in the gravity model: Wei 
(1996); Helliwell (1997, 1998); Nitsch (2000); Chen (2004). Remoteness of an im-
porting country i in relation to any trading partner j is given as the weighted average 
distance between country i and all trading partners other than j, where the weights are 
given by the GDP of the trading partners. In the studies mentioned above, remoteness 
rij, is defined as:   
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  , (2) 
and both rij and rji are included in the regression. However, as we will see in section 
5.3.1., this measure is open to criticism and yields results that are difficult to interpret. 
In particular, it becomes incompatible with steady-state and may yield to strange inter-
pretations of idiosyncratic shocks in the GDP’s of the trading partners.  
3.4. Other  Characteristics 
The gravity model can easily be appended with various institutional, cultural or his-
torical characteristics. Typically, gravity studies on European trade add a dummy vari-
able to indicate whether two countries speak the same language, share a common land 
border or member of a regional trade or currency agreement.  
3.5. Estimation  Method   
Parallel to the search for a solid theoretical foundation, researchers have also investi-
gated the econometric issues linked to the estimation of a gravity model. In a series of 
papers, Mátyás (1997, 1998), Egger (2000, 2001), and Cheng and Wall (1999) have 
used the advantages of panel techniques to test the trade determinants using the gravity 
equation. The pooled analysis then concerns the possibility to capture a variation be-
tween three dimensions: a two dimensional effect between importing and exporting 
countries and a time dimension.  
With panel data it is not clear, at least a priori, if one should estimate a random or a 
fixed country effects model. Mátyás (1997) assumed that the effects were observable 
from the data and therefore adopted a fixed effect approach. However, the same author 
(Mátyás, 1998), noted that the choice between random or fixed effects is rather sub-
jective and suggest using a random effect if the number of countries is large.  
In this paper, we estimate the gravity model using an iterated maximum likelihood ver-
sion of the generalized least squares (GLS) allowing for random effects.
2 For the ran-
dom effect, the error term in equation (1) is written as:  
                                                 
2   As an alternative, we could have used a version of the feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) using 
the Park-Kmenta or the Beck-Katz method. This method is based on the assumption that the variance 
and covariance matrix is unknown and finds a consistent estimator. The method consists of two 
sequential FGLS transformations: first, it eliminates serial correlation of the errors then it eliminates 
contemporaneous correlation of the errors. This method is less efficient than the model with random 
effects or OLS for data where the number of cross sectional units are larger than the number of time  
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  εijt = µi+ υj + ξijt    ,  (3) 
where µi and υj are the random unobserved effects of the importing and exporting 
country respectively (at a given time) while ξijt is a random component over countries 
and time. However, we note that this estimation method yields results that do not differ 
much from ordinary least squares. This point is further confirmed in section 7 where 
we compare the final model proposed in this chapter using both OLS and GLS 
allowing for random effects. 
4. Preliminary  Results 
Nitsch (2000), who has adopted equation (1) in his study of EU-intra trade in manu-
facturing, provides a good benchmark model. We replicate his model to EU trade in 
total manufacturing for 1990-1998. We estimated equation (1) by GLS allowing for 
random effects and follow the standard framework of using population as instruments 
for the GDP’s. For the sake of comparison, imports and GDPs are taken in nominal 
terms (underlined here to avoid confusion with constant price values). We also note 
that the reported results on the intercept and the home variable are constant over time. 
This is consistent with preliminary tests confirming section 6.3.2. 
Denoting by Aij and Lij, two dummies that indicate that countries share the same land 
border and language, respectively; and by Hii, the home effect, the resulting equation is 
(with standard errors of the coefficients in parentheses):  
mijt = -6.62 + .89 yit + .69 yjt – .79 dij + .36 Aij + .38 Lij + .76 rijt - .58 rjit + 2.59 Hii  (4) 
  (.57)    (.01)  (.01) (.03)  (.05) (.10)    (.08) (.08)  (.08) 
R
2 = 0.97; L = -1000.15; Random effects (variance): σ
2
µ  = .20,  σ
2
ν = .45,  σ
2
ξ = .18 
BP = 39.1; N = 1260. 
Our results are largely consistent with those from Nitsch. All coefficients except for 
remoteness have the expected sign, standard errors are low and the overall fit is high.
3 
                                                                                                                                             
points (N>T) because the estimated covariance matrix tend to underestimate the true variability of the 
estimator. See Beck and Katz (1995, pp. 636), Judge et al. (1985, pp. 492), Greene (2000, pp. 608) 
and Wooldridge (2002, pp. 158, 263) for a technical explanation of using the GLS and the 
implications when N>T.  
3   Here and throughout, R
2 is the squared correlation between actual and predicted values; L is the value 
of the log of the likelihood function at its estimated maximum., BP is the Breusch-Pagan test for 
heteroscedasticity and N is the number of observations.  
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Notice, however that our dataset differs somewhat to the one employed by Nitsch. His 
dataset is for the period 1983-1990, and does not include Sweden, Austria and Finland.  
The importing and exporting income elasticities, 0.89 and 0.69 respectively, are very 
similar to those obtained in Nitsch (2000). The coefficient of distance variable is 
slightly larger from previous studies where the consensus estimate is 0.6 (Leamer, 
1997). Chen (2004) suggests that reported distance coefficients that are much higher 
than the general agreed 0.6 elasticity could be explained by the use of different trans-
port modes. For example, in the European Union, 57.8% of total intra-EU trade went 
by road whereas most global trade is transported over sea.  
Nitsch (2000) follows Helliwell’s (1997) and incorporates two dummies that take the 
value of one only in the case of bilateral trade between countries that share a common 
language (Lij) and have a common border (Aij). The coefficients of both language and 
adjacency dummies are found to be statistically significant. The coefficient of the 
home variable (Hi = 2.59) means, that on average, EU10 countries trade about 14 times 
more with itself than they do with another EU country after controlling for other vari-
ables. This results, for the EU, is fairly close to Nitsch’ (2000) estimate of 16. 
5.  Extending the Gravity Model 
Despite its attractiveness, a model such as equation (4) raises a series of questions. In 
this section, the following questions will be addressed:  
(i)  The model imposes, without testing, constant income elasticities. Although, 
theoretically very convenient, this restriction may be empirically not vali-
dated and, if this is the case, it could be a source of the present degree of 
heteroscedasticity.   
(ii)  In principle, data on trade and income should be expressed in real terms but 
the choice of a deflator deserves particular attention.  
(iii)  The model ignores a price competitiveness effect, which certainly plays an 
important role in the evolution of intra-European trade.  
(iv)  As mentioned before, the definition of remoteness of the importing and ex-
porting country are not only questionable, their coefficients are inversely 
signed.     
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5.1.  Price Deflator and Competitiveness 
5.1.1.  Choice of a Deflator 
For the sake of comparison, Nitsch's equation (4) was estimated in current values. In 
principle, as we are dealing with time series, imports and incomes should be expressed 
in real terms. Although with the present sample the results are hardly different, the es-
timation in nominal terms may lead, for instance, to erroneously reject the hypothesis 
that α is constant through time.  
However, the choice of an adequate deflator is not straightforward. Indeed, several 
authors have criticized the traditional procedure of using the implicit deflator of im-
ports on the grounds that it incorporates a signal of a change in quality or in other vari-
ous factors of the same nature. One should also add that a substantial part of intra-EU 
trade is in fact intra-firm trade and the evolutions of firm's internal prices may differ 
from those of market prices. Therefore, some authors have opted for the GDP deflator. 
But the latter raises also problems. In particular, it represents above all an index of 
domestic costs (cf. infra). Moreover, since inflation is not homogenous across goods 
and services, the more disaggregated the analysis the less relevant it might be. An al-
ternative approach consists in modeling the export prices but that requires very restric-
tive assumptions on the structure of preferences and of the cost function and, in our 
opinion, it is well beyond the scope of this paper.  
We took the pragmatic view to compare the empirical merits of (both in logs) the im-
port price deflators, pit
m, and the GDP deflators, pit
y, and re-estimate model (4) as:  
 (mijt - pit
m) = γ (pit
y - pit
m) + RHS (4)   ,  (5) 
where RHS (4) is the right hand side of equation (4). This estimated value of γ is close 
to 0.9 significantly different from both zero and unity. Thus, although the GDP defla-
tor appears empirically better, in fact it does not matter which deflator is used as long 
as their ratio, that we shall denote Pit, is incorporated in the model. 
5.1.2.  The Competitiveness Effect 
With the functioning of the European Monetary System and, for the last years of our 
sample, the prospect of the European Monetary Union, maintaining competitiveness  
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has been a major objective in the conduct of macroeconomic policy for country mem-
bers and even for their non-member neighbors.
4  
Now, in particular for manufacturing goods, production techniques do not differ dra-
matically across the EU countries and thus unit costs of capital, energy and raw mate-
rials evolve in a parallel way. However, wage formation -- as well as gains in labor 
productivity -- is, especially in short run, country specific. Provided that the distribu-
tion of value added remains stable over time, its deflator evolves exactly as the same 
rate as unit labor cost. Thus, Pit that compares the GDP deflator to the average price of 
imported manufacturing goods is generally considered as a good proxy of competi-
tiveness. However, it only captures a general substitution effect on the domestic mar-
ket.
5  
As changes in competitiveness vary across countries, in order to explain imports from 
a specific country, we also include a measure of competitiveness based on the relative 
unit labor costs between the importing and exporting countries, namely:  
 rulcijt = (ulcit/∑kωikulckt)/(ulcjt/∑kωjkulckt)   ,  (6) 
where ulci and ωik denotes respectively the unit labor cost of country i and the share of 
country k in total import (of manufacturing goods) of country i. The weights (ωik) are 
computed from the average bilateral trades during the period 1990-1998.  
5.2.  The own Income Effect 
While the assumption of constant own income elasticity makes sense in a macroeco-
nomic relationship, it becomes questionable at a less aggregated level.
6 Indeed, when 
income grows, the structure of final demand, and therefore the structure of imports, 
changes. This evolution is probably more flexible than the one implied by the standard 
model. Consider the import ratio sk of a commodity (in our case, an industrial sector) k 
                                                 
4   For a theoretical argument, see among others, Giavazzi and Pagano (1988). As a practical example, 
the first Government of Mitterand (France, 1981) has shown how rapidly by inflating a country can 
create a trade deficit with, subsequently, a stabilization adjustment in terms of incomes and prices 
policy. 
5   Notice that in the case of imperfect competition, Pi captures a price effect while, in the price-taker 
case, it represents a supply effect (i.e. a loss in profitability). In both cases, a relative loss in the 
competitiveness of the importing country should increase its imports. 
6   The importance of the income elasticity at a more detailed level of manufacturing is further explored 
in chapter 3.   
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for a given country i: sik = Mik/Yik. According to equation 1 and ignoring the likely 
negligible effect of an income variation on the measure of remoteness, the evolution of 
sik is given by: 
  ∂sik/∂lnyi = sik (ß1 + ß2 - 1) . 
The estimated income elasticity (ß1 + ß2) for manufacturing goods is significantly 
above unity and thus, on a steady state, their import ratio is supposed to grow at a con-
stant rate. This is not very plausible. To the contrary, one expects that as income in-
creases, the share of most manufacturing goods will, at some income level, start to de-
cline. To allow for such a shape, we specify ß1 as:   
 ß 1 = ß11 + ß12 ycit ,  (7) 
where ycit is the logarithm of current per capita income, Ycit, with respect to an arbi-
trary reference level Yc°: 
 ycit = ln(Ycit/Yc°) .  (7’) 
We choose Yc° as the average per capita GDP of the EU countries in 1995 and thus 
ß11 is the estimated income elasticity at that point. The reader will notice the analogy 
of this specification with the quadratic version of the almost ideal demand system pro-
posed by Banks et al. (1997) in the context of households expenditure panels. Empiri-
cally, this specification has also the advantage of reducing the problem of heterosce-
dasticity generally present with panel data. 
5.3. Geographical  characteristics 
5.3.1. Remoteness 
The two remoteness variables in equation (2) where originally adopted by Wei (1996). 
However, the estimated coefficients are inversely signed which is not compatible with 
theory.
7 However, this formulation presents drawbacks of being not homogenous with 
respect to distance and income. More precisely, on a steady-state where all GDPs in-
crease at a constant rate, remoteness should not change. This will occur when the two 
                                                 
7   In a three-country case, if trade with country k’ that is more remote from country i but not from j (mij 
should increases), rij is supposed to increase. Similarly, if country k’ is more remote from country j 
but not from country i (mij should increases), rji is supposed to increase.   
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variables have identical coefficients with the opposite sign and this might explain the 
results obtained in equation (4).  
To avoid this problem, the variable that should enter is relative remoteness. In that 
spirit, we measure remoteness with a slightly different specification than equation (2):  



















/Y D , (8) 
This new definition of remoteness is expected to give a negative sign since for a given 
distance from other countries k, greater bilateral distance reduces trade while for a 
given bilateral distance, greater distance from other countries increases trade. It is 
worth noticing that in Deardorff (1995) remoteness also enters in relative terms where 
the weights are the domestic price indices rather than GDPs.  
5.3.2. Adjacency and Language 
We also take a different specification of the dummies for countries that share a same 
border and language as in our sample, three member countries that share the same lan-
guage also share the same border. The effect of the language dummy is then captured 
by an overlapping effect of the adjacency dummy. We therefore propose an alternative 
specification of including a dummy for countries sharing a same border and language 
(AL) and a dummy for countries sharing the same border but not the language (AN). 
We follow Helliwell (1997) and Nitsch (2000) method of assigning a value of one only 
in the case of bilateral trade flows. 
6. Econometric  Procedures 
Combining the proposed modifications, the model becomes:  
mijt = α + β11 yit + β12 ycit* yit + β2 yjt + δ dij + µ ANij + ν ALij + ρ rijt  
    + π Pit+ λ rulcijt+ η Hii +  εijt   .  (9) 
6.1. Estimator  Consistency 
As noted by the literature (Wooldridge, 2002; Beck and Katz, 1996), OLS estimates 
often violate the OLS standard assumptions when they are applied to pooled data.  
This is because the pooled OLS regression across country i and time t, assumes that (i) 
the errors are independent from a period to a next (no serial correlation); (ii) the errors  
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variance is constant across countries (homoscedasticity); and (iii) errors are not corre-
lated across countries (no contemporaneous correlation). However some complications 
may be likely to be present. For example, given the large differences between imports 
from different countries, heteroscedasticity is likely to occur and since the gravity 
specification includes characteristics (adjacency, language, distance) that are not inter-
dependent over time, serial correlation is likely to be present. For this purpose, we per-
formed some diagnostic tests.  
A series of Breusch-Pagan tests were carried out for different time periods. The null 
hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected in most of the cases and the Jarque-Bera test 
rejects the null hypothesis of normality. We also test for first-order autocorrelation in 
the residuals. Using the first-order autoregressive process (AR1), there is very strong 
evidence of serial correlation.  
We correct for the problem of AR(1) errors, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation by providing an iterated maximum likelihood version of the generalized 
least squares (GLS) allowing for random effects. In the random effect model, the serial 
correlation is exploited in the composite error term in a generalized least squares 
framework (Wooldridge, 2002).
8 In the presence of an AR (1) process, the usual rem-
edy is to include dynamics. We tested for co-integration and cannot reject it. This sug-
gests that it is worth to investigate a dynamic version of the model which we omit for 
the purpose of this paper. 
6.2. Instruments 
As the error term is most likely correlated with yi and yj most empirical studies use the 
log of the population as an instrument for the log of the GDP variables. However, as 
noted by McCallum (1995), the lack of instruments does not permit to deal adequately 
with this problem. In this spirit, we choose the following set of instruments: (i) GDP’s 
from the two previous years; (ii) current population and (iii) gross capital formation 
from the current and the two previous years. The model is estimated in a two-stage 
least squares method. In the first stage estimation, the regressions of the GDP for each 
country are performed for the years 1982-1998. In order to compare the 2SLS esti-
mates with (i) the population instrument and (ii) the new set of instruments, the Haus-
                                                 
8   In the random effect model, the serial correlation is generally regarded as a useful measure of the 
relative importance of the unobserved effect. In our example, this correlation is equal to the ratio of 
the variance of µi and νj to the variance of the composite error. See Wooldridge (2002, pp. 259).  
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man test (1978) for endogeneity yields a t-test value of 1.38 and thus does not permit 
to reject the hypothesis that the new instrumented GLS and the GLS estimates using 
population as instrument are statistically equivalent at the 5% significance level. 
6.3. Tests 
The estimation of equation (9) was accompanied with several tests. First, we tested for 
possible influential observations through a detailed analysis of the residuals, DFIT val-
ues, cooks distances and leverages. Second, we tested for the restriction that both the 
intercept and the coefficient of the border effect are constant over time. 
6.3.1. Influential Observations 
We proceeded to a preliminary analysis of examining influential observations by in-
vestigating the DFIT values. We then looked at the residuals and leverage statistics. 
These statistics were expressed in averages with normalized standard deviations by 
importing country, exporting country and year. The leverage statistics do not suggest 
any unusual features that would induce an anomaly of the fitting data and reports a 
range of values that are stable across countries and time. Subsequently, the residuals 
suggested that Ireland, the UK and Greece are potential outliers. We then looked at all 
the residuals from each observation and found that UK imports from Ireland are po-
tentially influential. For the years, the residuals show in 1993 a slightly break. From 
those tests we concluded that no observations appear to be pathological.  
6.3.2. Parameter Restrictions 
As written above equation (9) incorporates restrictions on the intercept and the con-
stancy of the border effects and this of course should be tested. First, we estimated 
yearly cross-section models, and inspected that the intercept showed a somewhat up-
ward trend while our parameter of interest, the border effect, remained constant over 
time. 
As a second insight into the analysis, we test the restriction that the border effect and 
the intercept is the same in each time period using the likelihood ratio test (LR). To do 
so, we transformed the gravity model into an unconstrained model where we include 
time dummies and allow the border effect to vary over time, written as:  
 m ijt = αt + ηt Hii  + RHS ( 9) ,  (10)  
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where RHS (9) is the right hand side of equation (9). In the general model (10), the co-
efficients of the intercept, αt, and the coefficient of the border effect, ηt, is allowed to 
change over time. When we impose the restriction that the intercept is constant over 
time, the value of the log-likelihood ratio test is 13.8 (the cut-off value of χ
2 with 8 re-
strictions is 15.5 at the 5% significance level). Alternatively, imposing the restriction 
of ηt to be constant, the value of the test is 9.46. This set of restrictions can not be re-
jected at the 5% confidence interval. The value of the log-likelihood ratio test is 23.26 
(the cut-off value of the χ
2 with 16 restrictions is 26.3). Notice however that allowing a 
different constant for 1993 was at the margin of rejection. We also tested whether there 
was a trend in αt and ηt which was also rejected. 
7. Results 
Equation (9) estimated by GLS, allowing for random effects yields: 
 m ijt = - 4.85 + .87 yit  -.021 ycit* yit + .66 yjt - .8 dij + .17 ANij + .45 ALij 
   (.41) (.01) (.004)    (.03) (.04) (.05) (.08) 
   - .34 rijt + .91 Pit + .16 rulcijt + 2.48 Hii  (11) 
  (.07)   (.04)  (.01) (.08) 
R
2=0.98; L=-934.41; Random effects (variance): σ
2
µ =.18,  σ
2
ν = .36, σ
2
ξ = .18 
BP = 23.87; N = 1260. 
We first note that all coefficients have the correct signs and relative low standard er-
rors. The Breusch-Pagan test reveals that heteroscedasticity is still somewhat high al-
though it has been reduced with respect to equation (4).  
Income Elasticities The coefficients of the income elasticities of the importing and ex-
porting countries are very similar to those of regression (4). Imports are more sensitive 
to home GDP than foreign GDP. It is worth noticing that enlarging the instruments for 
GDP’s hardly affects the income elasticities. The own income elasticity is slightly 
smaller than the EU average of 1995. This result indicates that as income grows the 
share of total manufacturing goods has a slow and declining income elasticity most 
likely in favor of services. Of course, it may substantial vary across sectors and we 
shall return to this issue in the next chapter.   
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Price Variables Both the coefficient of the general effect and the coefficient of the 
specific effect must be taken into account. For example; if country i experience a loss 
of competitiveness of 1% with respect to all its EU partners, imports will drop by 
slightly more than a percent (.9 + .16). This result is somewhat in contrast to studies 
that have used labor costs to explain export performance [Wolf (1997), Carlin, Glyn 
and Van Reenen (1999)]. A possible explanation is that we restrict our analysis to intra 
EU trade and also that our sample is more recent. Indeed, current trends in interna-
tional trade and the associated increase in international competition suggest a height-
ened importance of relative costs in performance. 
Geographic Variables The coefficients of bilateral distance and remoteness have the 
correct negative signs and are significant determinants of trade flows with an estimated 
elasticity of -.8 and -.34 respectively. The dummies for countries that share a same 
language and border (AL) and same border but different language (AN) are also found 
to have statistically significant effects with the correct signs. The effect of countries 
sharing a common language and land border is three times larger than for neighboring 
countries speaking different languages. 
The Border Effect The estimated coefficient of the border effect is 2.48 and it remains 
quite robust with the present specification of the gravity equation. It implies that do-
mestic trade is 12 times higher than intra-EU trade. 
Remoteness has the correct sign and is highly significant. In the literature however 
there is no general consensus of whether the variable should be there. To show the 
empirical importance of whether this variable should be there, we re-estimated 
equation (11) and dropping remoteness. The results are presented in table 1, column 
(2) in the appendix of this chapter. The most notable change is a drop of almost 10% in 
the income elasticity of the exporting country while the other variables remain robust.  
Some further Tests As a further diagnostic check, we re-estimate the basic gravity 
model without the augmented variables. In table 1, column (3), the results reveal an 
increase in the elasticities of the geographic variables (AN, AL) and a minor increase of 
the border effect. Generally speaking, we conclude that the border effect remains quite 
robust to alternative specifications of the gravity model. In addition, we also re-esti-
mated equation (11) using OLS. The results reported in table 1, column (1) confirm 
that similar results are yielded using both estimation methods.   
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8.  Harmonization of Technical Regulations 
The removal of technical barriers to trade (TBTs) has been one of the major factors af-
fecting intra-EU trade. The Commission (1998) calculated that, in 1996, over 79% of 
intra-EU trade in manufacturing was been affected by harmonized technical regula-
tions.  
In the empirical literature, the general approach to measure the effect of non-tariff bar-
riers has been based on the gravity model of international trade (see amongst others, 
Harrigan, 1993; Moenius, 1999; Head and Mayer, 2000; Otsuki et al. 2000). To gauge 
the impact of regulations, standards and other NTBs, the gravity model is then aug-
mented with frequency-type measures (e.g. number of regulations in an industry, trade-
weighted coverage ratios) that quantify the impact of NTBs. 
In this section, we will attempt to test to what extent the impact of harmonization of 
regulations has promoted EU trade. The idea is that country i will import more from 
country j that proportionally satisfies EU regulations more than an EU average. We as-
sume that trade is affected starting the year that an EU Directive, which we denote as 
k, is published.
9  
We construct a variable defined as:  


















) 1 ( ) 1 (
   . (12) 
The first term in brackets is a coverage ratio of the average (1990-1998) EU exports of 
country j that are subject to the harmonization of regulations in total average exports of 
country j and the second term is similarly constructed for average intra-EU exports.  
During the period 1990-1998, the most important change in harmonized regulations 
occurred in 1993 with the introduction of the machine directive. The scope of manu-
facturing sectors that are affected by of other new harmonized regulations (lifts, gas 
appliances, low voltage equipment, etc.) were of minor importance in 1990, 1991, 
1994 and 1995.  
                                                 
9   This assumption is probably not true since for some countries it may take more time to transpose the 
EU Directive in its national regulations. Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion on the construction 
of this variable.  
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The effect of the share variable on intra-EU trade and domestic trade is determinate. 
First the impact of harmonization for a given county increases trade and reduces do-
mestic trade. Moreover, the country that complies with EU harmonization more than 
the EU average, the more it should be able to penetrate foreign markets. 
We first separate out the effect of the removal of TBTs on imports in the case for in-
ternational trade (when i≠j) and domestic trade (when i=j). To do so, we multiply sjt 
with (1-Hii) for the case of EU bilateral trade and interacts sjt with Hii for the case of 
domestic trade. The resulting equation (with standard errors in parentheses) is: 
 m ijt = -5.50 + .83 yit  -.021 ycit*yit + .66 yjt - .46 dij + .15 ANij + .49 ALij  
      (.39)  (.01)  (.004)  (.05)  (.04)  (.04)  (.07) 
  - .35 rijt + .88 Pi,t+ .16 rulcijt + 2.95 sjt *(1- Hii) + .20 sjt * Hii   
   (.09)  (.04)  (.01)  (.12)  (.61) 
 +2.38  Hii  (13) 
 (0.07) 
R
2=0.95; L=-892.13; Random effects (variance): σ
2
µ =.12,  σ
2
ν = .57, σ
2
ξ = .18 
BP = 28.14; N = 1260. 
The harmonization of EU regulations plays an important role in explaining trade. The 
coefficient of sjt*(1-Hii) is strongly significant and positive. This suggests that any 
country j that is above the EU average share of harmonization significantly exports 
more to country i. In the case of domestic trade, we do not find any significant impact 
of harmonization of technical regulations on a possible reduction of border effects. The 
coefficient of sjt* H ii is .20 and not significantly different from zero. We also ran 
equation (13) on a sample that omits all the observations for domestic trade. The 
resulting equation (with standard errors in parentheses) is:  
 m ijt = -6.16 + .83 yit  -.018 ycit*yit + .70 yjt - .56 dij + .16 ANij + .42 ALij  
      (.42)  (.01)  (.004)  (.05)  (.04) (.04)   (.07) 
   -.23 rijt + .88 Pit+ .19 rulcijt + 2.43 sjt (14) 
  (.09) (.04)  (.01)  (.12) 
R
2=0.98; L=-631.60; Random effects (variance): σ
2
µ =.20,  σ
2
ν = .37, σ
2
ξ = .19 
BP = 23.71; N = 1170.  
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From equation (14), the coefficient of the share variable, sjt, remains strongly signifi-
cant and positive. The significance and sign of the other coefficients in equation (13) 
and (14) are generally in the same line from those obtained from resulting equation 
(11).  
To conclude, the results reported in this section, suggest that harmonization of techni-
cal regulations has played a significant role in explaining intra-EU trade. It is apparent 
that the application of harmonization of EU regulations plays an important role in 
promoting the extent of cross-border trade. However, we do not find evidence that 
harmonization decreases border effects. In a somewhat related paper, similar conclu-
sions are reached. Head and Mayer (2000) apply a gravity approach to 3-digit NACE 
data for the EU countries. They find that crude indicators of non-tariff barriers before 




This chapter is an attempt to provide some further insights into the estimation of an ap-
propriate functional form of a gravity model applied to EU bilateral trade flows in total 
manufacturing taking into account the downward impact of border effects. A special 
attention is given to the impact of harmonization of regulations in explaining EU bilat-
eral trade and domestic trade.  
We considered several methodological issues. From an economic point of view, we 
provided a theoretical consistent measure of remoteness, added competitiveness that is 
composed into a general and bilateral component and accounted for a flexible income 
response. From an econometric point of view, we considered a method of estimation 
and proposed a version of a general least squares estimation allowing for random ef-
fects.  
Several results are presented. First of all, we find evidence that the level of border ef-
fects is quite robust to a standard specification of the gravity equation such as the one 
estimated by Nitsch (2000) and to a more detailed specification of the gravity model 
                                                 
10  The authors use two indirect measures of EU non-tariff barriers (NTBs). The first measure is based on 
a 1980s survey of EU firms conducted by the European Commission. From this survey, the authors 
construct three variables representing the magnitude of the NTBs in terms of standard differences, 
public procurement and customs formalities. The second set of indicators comes from Buigues et al. 
(1990), which classified European industries into three levels of barriers: low, moderate, and high.  
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that we consider in this paper. In particular, we find that domestic trade in the EU is 
about 14 times larger than EU-bilateral trade. Secondly, we find that the border effect 
has not declined for 1990-1998. Thirdly, we find that harmonization of technical 
regulations cannot explain the presence of border effects while it has a positive impact 
on EU imports. Finally, our results indicate that the augmented economic variables 




Trade Data  
Trade data are taken from Eurostat (Comext). Bilateral trade data is recorded in euros. 
We deflate the imports data by an import unit price index – using 1995 as the base year 
–
  in order to obtain a real flow of trade. Our sample covers the period 1990-1998. The 
importing are the following ten EU countries: Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and United Kingdom while the ex-
porting countries are the previous 10 countries + the remaining EU countries: Belgium 
and Luxembourg treated as one, Finland, Sweden and Austria. The choice of 10 im-
porting countries was limited by data availability: Sweden, Finland, Austria and Bel-
gium/Luxembourg are omitted because there is no production data reported before 
1995. The sample therefore covers a total of (10*14*9) = 1260 observations.  
Other Data 
Internal distances dii, are taken from Nitsch (2000). For distances between countries dij, 
we follow the conventional method in the gravity literature and measure the direct 
(great circle) distance between the economic centers (capital cities).  
Production data are taken from the database Newcronos (Eurostat). Some in-between-
year observations are missing from the Newcronos database. Missing data, then, are 
approximated by applying a trend of the gross rate of value-added (in quantity) in each 
NACE sector.  
Gross Capital Formation (1995 Prices), GDP in current and constant prices, unit labor 
costs and population are obtained from the Newcronos database. For the Netherlands, 
Denmark and Spain, some missing values of unit labor costs were unavailable. For 
these countries, we approximated these missing observations using labor cost indexes 
that were computed by the European Commission (DG-ECOFIN). The series can be 
downloaded from ECODATA (available from the Belgian Ministry of Economic Af-
fairs, http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be). 
3. Data on Harmonization of Technical Regulations  
The data on technical regulations come from the Commission’s review of the impact 
of the Single Market in the EU (CEC, 1998). This study provides information at the 3-
digit level of the NACE classification of whether trade is affected by technical regula- 
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tions and the dominant approach used by the Commission to the removal of such barri-
ers in the EU. We derived the trade data according to the same NACE industrial classi-
fication applied to a panel of 15 EU countries of 1990-1998. Trade was then aggre-
gated into one broad group, consisting of all sectors that are subject to the harmoniza-
tion of technical regulations. 
A more detailed analysis of the data is given in chapter 5.   
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Table 1: Further Tests 


































































































   -936.86 -945.35  -1176.18 
Observations   1260  1260  1260 
Estimation  
Method 
OLS   RE-GLS  RE-GLS 






THE IMPACT OF HARMONIZATION OF TECHNICAL 
REGULATIONS ON BORDER EFFECTS AND INTRA-TRADE IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter, we re-examine how EU harmonization of technical regulations have 
affected the pattern of bilateral trade flows of individual EU countries taking into ac-
count the downward impact of national border on trade flows. We use the gravity 
specification adopted from the previous chapter. We disaggregate trade of manufac-
turing sectors in six types of categories: four categories are matched to the different 
approaches used by the European Commission to the removal of technical barriers to 
trade (TBTs), one category that comprises an aggregate of all harmonization ap-
proaches, and one category where technical barriers to trade are not important. 
We have several questions. We are particularly interested to see: 
(i)  whether there are differences in the border effect when applied to sectors where 
technical regulations are not deemed to be a potential trade barrier, to sectors 
where technical harmonization is important. Within this latter group, we are 
also able to assess whether there are differences in the size of the estimated 
border effect between sectors according to the approach adopted to the removal 
of TBTs. 
(ii)  whether the magnitude of the border effect has fallen since the creation of the 
Single Market. Within this we are particular interested to see: 
a.  whether the border effect is lower for sectors, which have already been sub-
jected to the harmonization of technical regulations; “old approach sec-
tors”.
1 
                                                 
This chapter draws on some ideas that were initially developed in a paper entitled “The Extent of 
Economic Integration in Europe: Border Effects, Technical Barriers to Trade & Home Bias in 
Consumption” written in collaboration with Paul Brenton during my fellowship at the Centre for 
European Policy Studies.  
1    The policy environment in sectors subject to detailed harmonization under the old approach has 
changed little over this period, see CEC (1998).   
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b.  whether sectors subject to the new approach and mutual recognition in the 
EU, where we might expect the impact of economic integration in the form 
of the Single Market to be the strongest, have experienced a greater fall in 
the border effect during our sample period of 1990 to 1998. 
(iii)  whether there are significant differences in the parameter values of the gravity 
model when applied to manufacturing sectors at a more detailed level.  
The data on technical regulations come from the Commission’s review of the impact 
of the Single Market in the EU (CEC, 1998). This study provides information at the 3-
digit level of the NACE classification of whether trade is affected by technical regula-
tions and the dominant approach used by the Commission to the removal of such barri-
ers in the EU: new approach, old approach, mutual recognition, multiple harmoniza-
tion approaches as well as an aggregate of sectors for which technical barriers are 
deemed to be unimportant. We derived the trade data according to the same NACE in-
dustrial classification applied to a same panel of 14 EU countries for 1990-1998 that 
has been proposed in chapter 2. Trade in each sector was then aggregated into these 
five broad groups. All the other data is the same as in chapter 2. In chapter 5, we give a 
more detailed analysis of the data.  
This paper continues in section 2 with a brief overview of the EU approach to the re-
moval of TBTs. In section 3, we present the empirical gravity model. In section 4, we 
present the results. In section 5, we provide some statistical inferences and in the final 
section we conclude. 
2.  EU Approach to the Removal of Technical Barriers to Trade 
EU policy related to technical regulations and testing and certification requirements is 
currently based upon two approaches: enforcement of the mutual recognition principle 
and, if this fails, the harmonization of technical standards across member states. Each 
approach will now be discussed in turn.  
2.1.  The Mutual Recognition Principle 
The basic EU approach to this issue of differences in national regulations is the princi-
ple of mutual recognition, which was developed on the basis of a European Court of 
Justice case law, the Cassis de Dijon and Dassonville judgments. The mutual recogni-
tion approach is based on the idea that products manufactured and tested in accordance  
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with the technical regulations of one member state can offer equivalent levels of pro-
tection to those provided by corresponding domestic rules and procedures in other 
member states. Thus, once a product is legally certified for sale in any member state it 
is presumed that it can be legally placed on the market of any member state, and as 
such has free circulation throughout the whole of the Single Market. The application of 
the mutual recognition principle requires a degree of trust between different countries 
and regulatory authorities that another country’s regulation can offer equivalent levels 
of protection and that such regulations are effectively implemented ensuring that 
products actually conform to the requirements of the regulations. Hence, the principle 
of the mutual recognition plays a significant role in the internal market since it ensures 
free movement of goods (and services) without making it necessary to harmonize na-
tional regulations. ‘Mutual Recognition’ tends to apply where products are new and 
specialized and it seems to be relatively effective for equipment goods and consumer 
durables, but it encounters difficulties where the product risk is high and consumers or 
users are directly exposed.  
2.2.  Harmonization of Technical standards 
Where ‘equivalence’ between levels of regulatory protection embodied in national 
regulations cannot be presumed, the EU has sought to remove TBTs through agree-
ment on a common set of legally binding requirements (= harmonization). Subse-
quently, no further legal impediments can prevent market access of complying 
products anywhere in the EU market. EU legislation on harmonizing technical specifi-
cations has involved two distinct approaches, the ‘old approach’ and the ‘new ap-
proach’.  
2.2.1.  Old Approach 
The initial approach adopted in the EU to harmonizing technical specifications was 
based upon extensive product-by-product or even component-by-component legisla-
tion carried out by means of detailed directives. Now known as the ‘old approach’ this 
type of harmonization proved to be slow and cumbersome. In the 1980s the ineffec-
tiveness of this approach was recognized when it became apparent that new national 
regulations were proliferating at a much faster rate than the production of harmonized 
EU directives (Pelkmans, 1987). This failure arose because the process of harmoniza-
tion had tended to become highly technical as it sought to specify individual require- 
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ments for each product category (including components). This resulted in extensive 
and drawn-out consultations.  In addition delays arose because the adoption of old ap-
proach directives required unanimity in the Council of Ministers. As a result the har-
monization process proceeded extremely slowly. The old approach applies mostly to 
products (chemicals, motor vehicles, pharmaceuticals and foodstuffs) by which the 
nature of the risk is clearly apparent.  
2.2.2.  New Approach 
In an attempt to overcome the drawbacks of the ‘old approach’ to the elimination of 
technical barriers to trade, the Commission launched in 1985 its ‘New Approach to 
Harmonization and Technical Standards’, focusing on the need to reduce the interven-
tion of the public authorities and on accelerated decision-making procedures prior to a 
product being placed on the market. For example, a key element in the adoption of the 
‘new approach’ is that the Council on the basis of majority voting can adopt directives. 
The new approach applies to products, which have “similar characteristics” and where 
there has been widespread divergence of technical regulations in EU countries. What 
makes this approach ‘new’ is that it only indicates ‘essential requirements’ and leaves 
greater freedom to manufacturers on how to satisfy those requirements, dispensing 
with the ‘old’ type of exhaustively detailed directives. The new approach directives 
provide for more flexibility by using the support of the established standardization 
bodies, CEN, CENELEC (European Standardization Committee for Electrical 
Products) and the national standard bodies. The standardization work is achieved in a 
more efficient way, is easier to update and involves greater participation from industry. 
3.  The Quantification of Harmonization of Technical Regulations in the Gravity 
Model 
In the empirical literature, the general approach to measure the effect of non-tariff bar-
riers has been based on the gravity model of international trade (see amongst others, 
Harrigan, 1993; Moenius, 1999; Head and Mayer, 2000; Otsuki et al. 2000).
2 Typi-
cally in a log-linear form, the model considers that the volume of bilateral trade is 
promoted by their economic size and constrained by their geographic distances. To 
gauge the impact of regulations, standards and other NTBs, the gravity model is then 
                                                 
2   See chapter 1 for a survey of this literature.  
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augmented with frequency-type measures (e.g. number of regulations in an industry, 
trade-weighted coverage ratios) that quantify the impact of NTBs. 
In this paper, we disaggregate trade of manufacturing sectors in six types of categories: 
four categories are matched to the different approaches used by the Commission to the 
removal of such barriers, one category that comprises an aggregate of all harmoniza-
tion approaches, and one category where technical barriers to trade are not important.  
The use of such data collection, as an input in an econometric approach, distinguishes 
itself from other studies since we no longer rely on the construction of indicators (e.g., 
frequency ratios such as, the number of product categories subject to a NBT, etc.) or 
other related proxies. Our data collection engenders a useful exercise in identifying the 
incidence of harmonization of technical regulations on trade. Namely, we not only 
report the implications of domestic trade under the harmonization of regulations but 
also trade patterns under conditions in which no regulations are imposed. This allows 
us to obtain comparables of a possible quantity reduction of the EU harmonization of 
regulations on domestic trade. 
3.1.  The Empirical Model 
Standard gravity equations are usually based on many specifications that sometimes 
include variables that do not have any theoretical grounds. Instead, we adapt a gravity 
specification of a model outlined in chapter 2 in order to capture the incidence of the 
harmonization of regulations on domestic trade. In that chapter, we have derived a 
functional form of the equation that is clearly defined such that misspecification is 
minimized. In addition to the core variables (income, distance, remoteness) the gravity 
specification is augmented with other trade determinants. These trade determinants 
have revealed a unique nature on characteristics of intra-EU trade applied to total 
manufacturing.  
Here we simply outline the salient features of the model. The specification has the 
following form:   
mijkt = αk + β11k yit + β12k ycit* yit + β2k yjt + δk dij + µk ANij + νk ALij + ρk rijt  
    + πk Pikt+ λk rulcijt+ ηk Hiik +  εijt   ,  (1) 
with time,  t =  1, … T; k refers to the group of manufacturing sectors according to the 
six types of categories: mij  is the volume (in logarithm) of imports by country i from  
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country j; yi is the level of (in logarithm) income (GDP) in country i; yj is the level of 
(in logarithm) income (GDP) in country j; dij is the distance (in logarithm) between the 
trading centers of the two countries, ALij and ANij are dummies for when countries 
share the (i) same border effect and same language, and (ii) same border but different 
language, respectively; yci is the per-capita income in country i with reference to the 
per-capita income for the EU in 1995, Hii captures the border effect by a dummy equal 
to 1 for domestic trade (when i = j) and 0 for international trade (when i ≠ j).  
We include two measures of competitiveness. Pik captures a general component of 
competitiveness and is measured by the difference between the logs of the import unit 
prices and the GDP implicit deflators: (pit
y-pikt
m). We also include a measure of com-
petitiveness based on the relative unit labor costs, rulcijt, between the importing and 
exporting country, namely: 
 rulcijt = (ulcit/∑hωihulcht)/(ulcjt/∑hωjhulcht)   , (2) 
where ulci and ωih denotes respectively the unit labor cost of country i and the share of 
country h in total imports (of manufacturing goods) of country i.
3 The weights are 
computed from the average bilateral trades during the period (1990-1998).  






















ij r    ,  (3) 
where the remoteness of  country i in relation to trading partner j given as the ratio of 
the weighted distance between country i and country j divided by the weighted-average 
distance between country i and all trading partners other than j. The weights are given 
by the GDP of the trading partners.  
4.   Econometric Results 
4.1. Estimation 
We estimate the gravity model using an iterated maximum likelihood version of the 
generalized least squares allowing for random effects (GLS-RE). For the random ef-
                                                 
3 There were too many missing values in the Eurostat data for collecting unit labor costs by sectors.   
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fect, we decompose the error term in equation (1) in three unobserved components 
written as:  
  ijt j i ijt ζ ν µ ε + + =    ,  (4)  
where µi and νj are the random unobserved effects of the importing and exporting 
country, respectively (at a given time); and ξijt is a random component over countries 
and time.  
In all subsequent regressions, we replace the predicted values of the GDPs (for each 
year and country) from a regression on several endowment measures that are used as 
instruments. The set of instruments are (i) the GDPs from the two previous years - this 
should be sufficiently to capture the variability from cyclical or temporary distur-
bances, (ii) current population and (iii) gross capital formation, as a proxy for invest-
ment, from the current and two previous years. The regression of the GDPs for each 
country is estimated between the periods 1982-2000. 
4.2. Results 
We now to turn to table 1 and apply the gravity model to two broad aggregates: col-
umn (1) an aggregate of sectors subject to new approach, old approach, mutual recog-
nition and a small number of sectors where multiple harmonization approaches apply 
and (column 2) to those were technical regulations do not cause barriers to trade.  
The overall fit is high in each regression and for most of the variables, standard errors 
are low. The importing and exporting elasticities are strongly significant and have the 
correct sign. For both groups, the own importing income elasticity (import demand) is 
larger than the elasticity of the exporting country (exporter’s GDP reflects how large a 
range of products a country has to offer). This is consistent with the assumption that 
higher demand of imports is more sensitive to the home GDP than the foreign GDP. 
This effect is more pronounced for imports of sectors that are not regulated by techni-
cal barriers to trade. The effect that accounts for non-constant income elasticities 
(ycit*yit) is significant and has the expected negative sign in both samples. This effect is 
twice as large for imports subject to harmonization of technical regulations.  
The estimated elasticity of imports with respect to distance, dij, is –0.90 and –0.40 re-
spectively, for the group of sectors where harmonization of regulations is applied and 
the group of sectors were technical regulations do not cause barriers to trade. The gen- 
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eral consensus of the distance variable in the literature is 0.6 (Leamer, 1997). Remote-
ness, rij, has the expected negative sign. The results on the coefficients of bilateral dis-
tance and remoteness suggest that differences in the effect of these two variables are 
more pronounced across both samples. It reveals that these variables intended to cap-
ture trade frictions other than those that are accounted for in our gravity model have a 
more dampening effect for trade in sectors that are regulated by EU harmonization. 
This result is somewhat consistent with the fact that trade in sectors that are not regu-
lated by EU harmonization are characterized by a lesser degree of specialization or 
complexity. This may reflect an interpretation that for those sectors, there is a lower 
cost in transportability being captured by the bilateral distance variable.  
The dummies for countries that share a same language and border (ALij) and same bor-
der but different language (ANij) are also found to be statistically significant, with the 
correct signs. These dummies have a slightly larger effect on imports of the group of 
sectors where TBTs are not present.
4  
Both coefficients that capture the competitiveness effects are statistically significant 
with a correct sign in both groups. A general effect of competitiveness, that is the in-
dex ratio of the GDP deflator and unit import prices, Pik, is omitted in the estimation 
for the group of sectors where harmonization of regulations is applied and has an 
elasticity for 0.72% for the group of sectors were technical regulations do not cause 
barriers to trade. In the first regression, we omitted this variable since the coefficient of 
the ratio was significant not different from 1 (0.98). As a result, we re-estimated the 
regression using the GDP deflator as suggested from this result.  
A bilateral effect captured by relative unit labor costs, rulcij, increases imports with an 
elasticity of 0.15% and 0.14% respectively for the group of sectors where harmoniza-
tion of regulations is applied and the group of sectors were technical regulations do not 
cause barriers to trade. These results indicate that imports in sectors that are regulated 
by EU harmonization are more sensitive to differences between domestic and foreign 
price inflation while differences in a specific bilateral price effect, captured by relative 
unit labor costs, are less apparent between both groups.  
                                                 
4   We assign zero to the two dummies for the observation that captures intra-national trade. This 
permits us to capture the border effect on intra-country trade by not taking into account the 
geographical effects of language and adjacency captured by the dummies (AL, AN).   
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The estimated parameters of the border effect, Hi, are large and strongly significant in 
both samples. We find that the border effect remains substantial for products where the 
EU has sought to introduce harmonized technical regulations to remove technical bar-
riers to trade. It implies that domestic trade is 11.1 (e
2.41) times higher than the coun-
try’s trade with its partners. On the other hand, we find a border effect of factor 11.5 
for products where differences in technical regulations are not deemed to be important 
constraints upon intra-EU trade. The results suggest that harmonization of technical 
regulations cannot explain the variability of border effects. Nevertheless, we would 
expect that those industries where no TBTs persist would have a lower intensity of 
domestic trade than those industries where the EU has sought to introduce harmonized 
technical regulations so to remove TBTs.  
In a somewhat related paper, similar conclusions are reached. Head and Mayer (2000) 
apply a gravity approach to 3-digit NACE data for the EU countries. They find that 
crude indicators of non-tariff barriers before and during the Single Market Program 
cannot explain the variation in the size of estimated border effects.
5 
Finally, we provide results for our three groups of products where harmonization of 
technical regulations are important grouped according to the approach adopted in the 
EU to the removal of technical barriers to trade (column 3-5) and for a small number 
of sectors where multiple harmonization approaches apply (column 6).  
All the coefficients have the expected sign and a large variability is present among 
some of the coefficients. In all four categories, the income elasticities of both the im-
porter and exporter are significant with the expected signs. Hence, the income effect of 
the exporter is exceptional large for sector regulated by multiple harmonization ap-
proaches and low for sectors regulated by mutual recognition. The effect that accounts 
for non-constant income elasticities has the expected negative sign and is significant, 
at the 95% confidence interval, for all groups except for mutual recognition. This ef-
fects is most pronounced for imports of sectors under the old approach, exactly those 
sectors that are somewhat dominated by the food industry and other traditional indus-
tries (chemicals, steel) that are characterized by a lesser degree of specialization. We 
                                                 
5   The authors use two indirect measures of EU non-tariff barriers (NTBs).  The first measure is based 
on a 1980s survey of EU firms conducted by the European Commission. From this survey, the authors 
construct three variables representing the magnitude of the NTBs in terms of standard differences, 
public procurement and customs formalities. The second set of indicators comes from Buigues et al. 
(1990), which classified European industries into three levels of barriers: low, moderate, and high.  
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return to this issue in section 5.1, were we re-estimate the gravity model on a more 
detailed level of sectors subjected to each harmonization approach.  
In all four cases, bilateral distance and remoteness are strongly significant determi-
nants of trade flows. The elasticities of these variables are unusual high for trade in 
sectors that are regulated by multiple harmonization approaches. The dummies for 
countries that share a same language and border (ALij) and same border but different 
language (ANij) are also found to be statistically significant except for the group of 
sectors where mutual recognition is applied.  
The results on the coefficients of the competitiveness variables, Pi and rulcij, are sta-
tistically significant with expected signs in all four groups. Again, for the old approach 
sectors, this coefficient was not statistically different from 1 (1.007) and therefore 
omitted from the regression using the GDP deflator as an appropriate deflator for the 
dependent variable.  
There is a much wider variability in the elasticities of unit labor costs ranging from 
0.08 for new approach sectors to 0.27 for sectors regulated by mutual recognition 
while the coefficients that capture a general competitiveness range from 0.86 for sec-
tors regulated by multiple harmonization approaches to 1.007 for old approach sectors.  
The coefficient of the border effect is significantly positive but varies across catego-
ries. The coefficients of the border effects for new and old approach sectors are 2.7 and 
2.6 respectively. A coefficient of 1.46 for the border effect for products under mutual 
recognition indicates the lowest intensity of domestic trade. The border effect for sec-
tors that are regulated by a combination of harmonization approaches is 2.55. These 
results suggest that the presence of border effects is important but that the extent of 
this bias against trade with other EU countries varies according to the approach to the 
removal of technical barriers to trade.  
4.3.  Evolution over time 
We now turn to the analysis of changes in border effects over time. In particular we are 
interested whether reduction in border effects occurred for sectors that are identified as 
being subjected to the harmonization of technical barriers to trade. Our method of es-
timating gravity model (1) imposes restrictions that the border effect and the intercept 
are the same for all time t. This model may be too restrictive because it assumes that  
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the border effects that we obtain from table 1 are the same throughout the entire pe-
riod.
6  
Table 2, in the appendix, summarizes the results of the four log-likelihood ratio tests 
(consistent with the test described in the previous chapter), undertaken for each regres-
sion subject to category k. .  
The test reveals that none of the two restrictions are rejected with respect to the regres-
sions on sectors that are subject to an aggregate of harmonization approaches, old ap-
proach and others. The restriction that the intercept is constant over time is rejected for 
sectors under the mutual recognition, new approach and no harmonization. The re-
striction that the border effect is the same over time is solely rejected for sectors under 
the new approach. We note that from the data (see chapter 5, section 2.1.2) the trade 
proportion of new approach sectors in sectors subject to an aggregate of harmonization 
approach is relatively small. This may explain why the restriction of constant border 
effects is not rejected in the latter group. 
The year-by-year evolution of the border effect for sectors under the new approach is 
presented in table 3, where we employ a regression with intercepts and time-dependent 
border effects as suggested by the test. For the period 1990-1998, we observe that the 
border effects have decreased from of a coefficient of 3.06 to 1.98. Between 1992-
1993 and 1997-1998, the new approach increases slightly. This result suggests that the 
intensity of internal trade relative to EU trade has decreased for new approach sectors; 
exactly those sectors were we would anticipate that the impact of harmonization would 
be most pronounced. 
A final issue to note is that we find empirical evidence that the border effect for trade 
in sectors that are regulated by mutual recognition has the lowest level. This suggests 
that the application of the mutual recognition is a powerful tool in promoting cross-
border integration in Europe. However, our results also indicate that the intensity of 
domestic trade relatively to EU bilateral trade remains unchanged for 1990-1998. We 
might have expected that over time, cross-border trade increases because it avoids the 
                                                 
6   In Chapter 2, we do not reject the assumption that the restricted gravity model (1) is reasonable on an 
estimation of intra-EU bilateral trade of ‘total manufacturing’. This assumption may not apply on a 
gravity model estimation of several groups of manufacturing sectors aggregated according to the 
several harmonization approaches that we consider in this paper.    
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systematic creation of harmonization rules under the old approach and to a lesser ex-
tent, the new approach.  
This points out to some limitation of the application of the mutual recognition princi-
ple. Related literature (Brenton, 2002; CEC, 1999; CEC, 2000; Pelkmans, 1998) notes 
that there are still obstacles with the application of the MRP preventing full benefit of 
a Single Market from being gained. For example, a European commission’s study 
(CEC, 2000) recognizes that difficulties with the application of the principle of mutual 
recognition appear particularly in the new technology sectors and for complex 
products. Brenton (2002) notes that the enforcement of mutual recognition can be a 
timely consuming process. CEC (1999) reports an average length of procedures for 
cases of infringement of mutual recognition of 15.5 months (Brenton, 2002). Accord-
ing to Pelkmans (1998), the application of the mutual recognition is demanding be-
cause its credibility in the market place critically hinges on very extensive monitoring, 
accessibility of the monitoring authority for complaints and the legal and manpower 
capacity to impose legal and easy-access to justice. This reflects, in part, a lack of con-
fidence in acts adopted by the authorities of the member states and administrative de-
lays. 
5. Diagnostics 
As a further diagnostic, we also re-estimated gravity model (1) according to the speci-
fication that has been suggested by the likelihood-ratio tests on the sample of non-
technical regulations and mutual recognition sectors. The coefficient of the border ef-
fect is 2.46 for the sample of non-technical regulations and 1.54 for the mutual recog-
nition sample. When this is measured against the estimates of the most restricted esti-
mation (see table 1) yielding coefficients of 2.45 and 1.46, respectively, it is clear that 
our estimates of the border effect are robust.  
We also compared the other coefficients including for the regression on new approach 
sectors to those we obtained from the restricted model (from table 1). The most notable 
change occurs in the sample of new approach sectors: the income elasticity of the ex-
porting country is 1.07 measured against .82 from the restricted model.     
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5.1. Test on a more disaggregated analysis 
In table 4 of the appendix, we re-estimated the gravity model on a very few number of 
sectors that have a similar nature of characteristics within each harmonization ap-
proach. We are merely interested to see how the coefficients on the various variables 
would change and are validated when we consider a much more detailed level of ag-
gregation. From the table, it is inferred that there is a much larger variability of the 
various coefficients of each variable. With few exceptions of some coefficients, all co-
efficients retain the expected sign and are significantly different from zero.  
Of main interest, the border coefficient shows a much larger variability within each 
category. In particular, basic chemicals, being regulated by mutual recognition, have a 
border coefficient that is not significantly different from zero. The border effect for the 
machinery sectors being regulated by the new approach is considerably large while 
those for the food sectors (old approach) and footwear, leather, wool, cotton (no regu-
lation) have a coefficient of 1.48 and 1.79 respectively.  
Some differences between those sectors regulated by one of the harmonization ap-
proaches and those that are not regulated become more apparent. The effect of bilateral 
distances is more pronounced for those sectors that are regulated by each of the har-
monization approaches. This is consistent with the finding from the previous section. 
The income elasticities are much more pronounced for machinery and basic chemicals.  
The per-capita own income elasticity is declining for those sectors that are regulated 
by each of the harmonization approach. Labeling machinery, as a (relative) much more 
specialized sector, shows the slowest declining income elasticity. The results that we 
obtained in this table reveal that generally speaking, all other coefficients retain the 
expected sign with low standard errors. 
6.  Summary of the Results and Conclusion 
Our results suggest that the impact of policy related barriers such as harmonization of 
technical regulations are of relatively minor importance in explaining the variability of 
border effects between sectors where harmonization approaches are present and sectors 
where differences in technical regulations are not thought to be important barriers to 
trade. The presence of large border effects found in each of these two categories does 
not exhibit any declining trend.   
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Secondly, evidence suggests some degree of variability of the level of border effects 
across each group of sectors that are regulated by a type of harmonization approach. 
We find that sectors where harmonization of regulations are of minor importance, 
mutual recognition, exhibit small border effects. Old approach sectors where there 
have been substantial efforts to remove regulatory barriers to trade still reflect large 
border effects. In addition, the border effect of these sectors has remained constant 
over time. New approach sectors where the harmonization of regulations is less com-
plicated exhibit an increasing trend of cross-border integration.  
For EU policy, this provides some insights to what extent the approaches that they 
have adopted are successfully removing technical barriers to trade and integrating 
European markets. It is apparent that the application of the mutual recognition plays an 
important role in limiting the extent of cross-border constraints and a more effectively 
implementation of this approach would clearly result in additional gains over time. The 
same is true for the new approach. We find that efforts to remove technical barriers in 
these sectors have led to less intra-national trade during the period of analysis. An im-
portant implication of these two results is that a higher degree of market integration 
has been possible for sectors that are regulated by EU policies that require the lowest 
degree of complicated harmonization procedures. 
At present, we would conclude that the presence of border effects appear to be rela-
tively robust. These results do suggest that policy factors such as harmonization of 
technical regulations do reveal some importance in evaluating the presence of border 
effects. However, harmonization of technical regulations can not be the only factor 
since we find substantial and persistent border effects for sectors where technical 
regulations are not important. The key issue regarding the estimated levels of the bor-
der effect is that we accounted for a large set of other economic factors in the specifi-
cation of the gravity model. These other economic factors have been derived from an 
exercise on validating a functional form of the gravity model that contains persuasive 
trade determinants that are typical to intra-European trade.  
In addition, comparing the coefficient of each of these determinants including the bor-
der effects with different samples of manufacturing sectors, has revealed important  
information on the gravity equation applied to intra-EU trade. The general conclusion 
is that in practice our gravity equation can be estimated on different levels of aggre- 
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Table 1:    Gravity Estimates of Groups of Sectors regulated by the different 
Harmonization Approaches 
























































































































































































































































Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. (a)
 R
2 is the squared correlation between actual and 







2ξ) > 0 (See 
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 259). (c) For the groups that comprise an aggregated of Technical Regulations 
and the Old Approach Products, the price index ratio, Pi, is not statistically different from 1 (their values 
are 0.98 and 1.007 respectively). We therefore dropped this variable from the regression and deflated the 
dependent variable using the GDP deflator.     
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αk ; ηkt against αk ; ηk  10.38 
(.24) 




Notes: The table list the χ
2 distribution with 8 degrees of freedom. P- values of the significance 





Table 3: Evolution of border effect for New Approach sectors, 1990-1998 












Notes: The table list the coefficient of the border effect, Hi, multiplied by a time dummy for each 
year between 1990-1998. The coefficients are obtained from regressing gravity model (1) 
augmented with time-dependent intercepts. Not reported in the table, all coefficients are 
significant at 95% significance level.   
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Notes: NACE codes are for (i) 431, 432, 433, 435, 441, 442, 451 (ii) 321, 322, 323, 
324, 325, 326, 327 (iii) 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 421 (iv) 251 
 
































































































































































   -995.903 -975.31 -895.40 -998.29 
Observations   1260 1260 1260 1260 
Estimation  
Method 




ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TRADE IN AN ENLARGED EUROPE: 
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 
1. Introduction   
A number of recent econometric studies suggest to date that the impact of domestic envi-
ronmental regulations
1 on trade has been small. The tested hypothesis on trade and environ-
mental regulations is an implication of most theoretical work that has shown that a weaken-
ing of domestic environmental regulations (considered as a comparative advantage due to a 
cost advantage) increases a country’s exports or decreases a country’s imports (see Copeland 
and Taylor, 2003, for a review of the theoretical literature). There are two main kinds of em-
pirical evidence advanced. First, it is noted that the cost of meeting environmental regula-
tions form a small part of total costs of production. For example, in the 24 most polluting in-
dustries in the US, Tobey (1990) found that environmental regulations accounted for 1.92% - 
2.8% of total costs. Second, there have been (mainly US) studies that found support for the 
prediction that domestic environmental regulations have a larger effect on trade when they 
are treated as endogenous. 
The view that environmental regulations should be set endogenously is rooted in the litera-
ture of endogenous protection (e.g. Trefler, 1993). According to this literature, trade liberali-
zation will put pressure on governments to weaken environmental policy to help firms in re-
sponse to an increase of trade competitiveness. For example, Ederington and Minier (2003) 
found evidence that after explicitly controlling for the endogeneity of domestic environ-
mental policy (i) more stringent environmental policies act as a barrier to trade and (ii) do-
mestic environmental policy is responsive to pressures from increasing trade liberalization 
effects. 
                                                 
This chapter is written jointly with Andrea Mantovani (CORE). This chapter draws on some ideas that were 
initially developed in another joint paper entitled « The Harmonization of Environmental Regulations, 
Innovation and Export Performance: Theory with an application to EU environmental Regulations » - May, 
2003. We would like to thank Daniel Weiserbs, Eric Strobl, Hubert Kempf and Dominique Simonis for their 
helpful comments; seminar participants at the doctoral workshop of the Catholic University of Louvain and the 
University of Bologna, the European Trade and Study Group Conference (Nottingham, 2004), the 2
nd Jean 
Monnet Workshop (Prague, 2004) and the European Commission for their comments on an earlier version of 
this paper.  
1    We treat domestic environmental regulations, domestic environmental standards, and cost of domestic 
environmental protection synonymously.   
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In this paper, we analyze the link between environmental policy and trade with particular 
reference to Europe. There are two points that we address. The first, rather obvious point is 
to test how the level of domestic environmental regulations has impacted trade. The second 
point we want to focus on is the question of whether governments (countries) may wish to 
weaken their environmental policies in order to achieve trade objectives. In particularly, we 
look how national environmental policies and harmonized environmental regulations at the 
EU level have collided and influenced trade. 
Inferences made in the case of the movement towards harmonization, as in the EU, are not 
straightforward. If we view the harmonization of EU environmental regulations purely as a 
trade instrument, its impact on domestic environmental regulations would be according to 
the prediction of the theory of endogenous protection substitutable: namely, more harmo-
nized environmental regulations (= reduction of technical barriers to trade and hence, more 
exports) would lead governments to reduce the level of their domestic environmental pro-
tection. However, the link between EU harmonized regulations and initiatives at the domes-
tic level are more than a trading instrument. 
In recent years, the EU has recognized that the “trade-promoting effect of harmonized regu-
lations coupled with growing environmental challenges and greater environmental awareness 
at the national level should no longer move along separate paths but should reveal some de-
gree of synergy” (CEC, 1999).
2 This anecdotal evidence suggests that trade and environ-
mental policy are linked through the harmonization of EU environmental regulations be-
cause more specific legislative instruments, intended to ensure both the protection of the en-
vironment and free trade are incorporated in the harmonization of environmental regula-
tions.
3 
With particular reference to the completion of the Single market, the interaction between 
domestic and harmonized environmental regulations at the EU level tend to reduce the flexi-
bility to lower or increase the stringency of domestic regulations since it is bounded between 
a certain minimum and maximum level. In other words, member countries may lower their 
own environmental standards to e.g. the lowest common denominator of an individual mem-
ber state, conformed to a minimum EU standard.
4 These minimum EU standards set a 
regulatory floor that ensures that all member states require at least a baseline level of envi-
                                                 
2   See http://europa.eu.int/internal_market/en/update/general/263en.pdf (June, 1999)  
3      In section 2, we review some of the areas where the legislation of the EU Environmental Policy has 
incorporated are greater awareness to environmental protection.  
4   See Esty and Gerardin (1997) for a general discussion on the environmental policy in the EU   
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ronmental protection of their industries. On the other hand, domestic governments may also 
have economic incentives to adopt stricter domestic regulations in light of the Single mar-
ket.
5 However, these are bounded up to a certain level such that these initiatives do not re-
strict intra-EU trade. In the context of EU enlargement, such incentives are straightforward 
because EU policy has been oriented towards a number of Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEEC) countries to adopt more stringent process and product regulations in order 
to conform to the EU.
6 
To address this analysis, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations: an equation 
modeling the impact of domestic environmental regulations on exports and an equation 
modeling the determination of exports and the harmonization of EU environmental regula-
tions on domestic environmental regulations. A special attention is given to the fact that in 
the context of CEEC enlargement, an asymmetric nature exists related to the environmental 
policy both at the EU and national level.  
In order to discern the impact of the harmonization of environmental standards and evaluate 
the cost of complying with domestic environmental regulations, we use a constructed data-
base drawn from two sources. The data on EU environmental regulations come from the de-
tailed study undertaken for the Commission’s review of the impact of the Single Market in 
the EU. We measure the incidence of the harmonization of EU standards on trade that differ-
entiate sectors according to a European classification, which specifically identifies sectors 
where the EU has sought to introduce the harmonization of environmental regulations. In or-
der to calculate the compliance cost with domestic environmental regulations, we use an in-
dicator of the economic resources spent on environmental protection in total manufacturing. 
This data comes from Eurostat (Newcronos) and is available for some European and Central 
                                                 
5   Stricter domestic standards may also create advantages solely at the national level. For example, Vogel 
(1999) notes “stricter environmental regulations may not make a nation poorer, neither do they make it 
richer; greater wealth leads to a preference for strong regulatory standards, not the reverse…”.  In addition, 
the same author argues that stricter environmental regulations can improve the public benefits (e.g. better 
health leads to productivity, reduction of health-care expenditures) and if such environmental regulations are 
seen as a form of collective consumption, then “many citizens in relatively affluent countries would be 
expected to increase their consumption of such goods, even at the price of some reductions in their levels of 
private consumption”.   
6   There is also some theoretical support for initiatives of governments to adopt stricter domestic regulations 
when being part of a regional integration agreement. Alpay (2000) highlight the incentive to adopt more 
stringent environmental policies so to favorably influence world prices. In a more recent paper, Gulati (2003) 
assumes that the adoption of free trade agreement of a small country implies exogenous prices and no control 
of domestic rates of protection. In such a framework, the author shows that stricter domestic environmental 




Eastern countries. In chapter 5, we describe the sources of the data that are analyzed and dis-
cuss some graphs.  
The paper continues in section 2 by discussing EU and CEEC policies of environmental 
regulations. In section 3, we present a brief literature review. In section 4 we discuss our 
empirical model. The results and conclusions are presented in the final sections.  
2.  Environmental Policy in EU and Candidate Countries 
In the context of environmental policy in EU and CEEC candidate countries, the objective of 
preserving free trade within the Single Market and promoting environmental protection pre-
sents a great challenge (Bailey, 1999). With the completion of the Single market, the Euro-
pean Commission (EC) has used the harmonization of environmental standards as a strategy 
to eliminate environmental obstacles to trade. In the process of harmonization initiatives, di-
rectives are then adopted, which require member and candidate member states to replace na-
tional regulations by harmonized procedures and standards.  
In recent years, the EC has increasingly relied on the “new approach” to harmonization.
7 The 
central characteristic of the “new approach” is that it limits harmonization to the EC level of 
“essential requirements” necessary to ensure the free movement of a product. If a product 
meets these specifications, it benefits from the presumption that it satisfies the EC’s essential 
requirements and thus should be allowed to circulate freely throughout the EU. The EC has, 
for example, adopted total harmonization in the areas of waste and packaging waste, chemi-
cals, vehicle emission standards, machinery, etc.   
However, the EC has also become increasingly sensitive to environmental objectives that do 
not specifically have an economic motivation.
8 Within this context, these environmental 
objectives should not prevent member states from adopting legitimate environmental stan-
dards through the principle of subsidiarity which allows member states to introduce further 
the restrictions to protect the environment. With this principle of subsidiarity, the environ-
mental policy in the EU has allowed member states to retain considerable control (or sover-
eignty) to the domestic implementation that has been agreed in the environmental objectives 
of the EU program. As a result, member states may maintain or introduce more or less strin-
gent protection measures as long as (i) these initiatives do not restrict trade in the EU; and 
                                                 
7   Noted in the report “Efficiency and accountability in European standardization under the new approach”, 
COM (1998) Final. 
8   Article 130 declared, “environmental protection requirements shall be a component of the Community’s 
other policies” (CEC, 1995).  
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(ii) are conform to a minimum level of domestic environmental protection defined by the 
EC.   
In recent years, the EC has undertaken many initiatives in order to achieve a high degree of 
environmental protection and to preserve free trade in the EU. For example, in the area of 
Waste, Directive 94/62 defines the essential requirements regarding waste packaging and 
sets targets for the recovery and recycling of packaging waste. In the area of chemicals, Di-
rective 88/379 known as the “Preparation Directive”, rules have been introduced for the 
gaseous preparation for safety data sheets and child resistance fastenings. Directive 93/67 
sets up harmonized risk assessment procedures to be followed by manufacturers and import-
ers for all new chemical substances that they place on the market. In the area of vehicles, Di-
rective 94/414 limits the emissions of motor vehicles and new rules are, in co-operation of 
stakeholders in member states, frequently updated. The EC has also adopted an eco-labeling 
scheme designed to inform consumers about the environmental qualities of products and to 
ensure that these products achieve high levels of environmental friendliness. This policy, 
however, does not override national eco-label schemes. 
2.1.  The Green Acquis 
In the forthcoming enlargement, the environmental protection procedure does not perfectly 
coincide between the EU and CEEC countries. This relates to the EC’s believe that “there is 
a gap between the level of environmental protection in CEEC countries compared with the 
situation in the EU” (CEC, 2000). Dziegielewska (1999) notes that the “EU countries are 
mainly concerned with global environmental problems, such as decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions, ozone-layer protection, acidification reductions, etc. while the candidate countries 
are primarily interested in solving the most pressing local environmental problems such as, 
waste, lead reductions.” 
The candidate countries’ policies aimed at the protection of the domestic environment is far 
more integrated and guided by the EU guidelines than the current members. In order to re-
tain environment sustainability, the EU has adopted the environmental acquis which relates 
to a compliance procedure with environmental regulations (aimed at the environmental pro-
tection) that need to be transposed in the national regulations of the candidate countries. In 
practice, it imposes major physical investments from candidate countries related to relatively 
few directives, with the most costly ones related to water, pollution control and power.
9 
Meeting the acquis is a condition for EU membership. However, the approximation to the 
                                                 
9   See Hager (2002, pp. 5) for a list of all the Directives that are related to the acquis.  
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environmental regulations is a continuing process where problems and priorities are ad-
dressed during and after the accession period. The compliance cost as a result of meeting the 
acquis is estimated between 2% to 3% of the GDP and are borne by both the private industry 
and the public sector. These costs will be partially compensated by the European Union. It is 
expected that the EU covers about 10% to 20% of the national expenditures in the environ-
mental sector (CEC, 1999).  
3. Literature 
In this section, we mainly focus on the evidence from empirical literature of linking envi-
ronmental policy on trade flows in an endogenous setting. This literature predicts that do-
mestic governments may have incentives to manipulate environmental policy to help do-
mestic firms in response to trade liberalization. This suggests that environmental policy can 
be used as a trade instrument to protect industries (second-best trade models, endogenous 
protection). For these reasons, previous work that treated environmental policy as exogenous 
was getting biased results. If trade considerations play a role in the setting of environmental 
regulations as is assumed by second-best trade models (Gawande, 1999; Trefler, 1993), these 
regulations should be treated as endogenous.  
The endogeneity of environmental domestic regulations are accounted for by estimating a 
simultaneous equation where in the first stage of the estimation a set of instruments are used 
that account for government instruments that proxy a trade liberalization effect such as tar-
iffs, non-tariff barriers, etc. The evidence indicates that after explicitly controlling for the 
endogeneity of domestic environmental policy, more stringent environmental policies act as 
a barrier to trade. These results were in contrast with earlier findings (Tobey, 1990; Van 
Beers and van Bergh, 1997; Harris et al., 2000) that did not account for the endogeneity of 
domestic environmental regulations and found that environmental policies across countries 
or sectors have minor effects on trade flows.   
The concern that regulations will be relaxed in industries that face significant foreign com-
petition is motivated by a seminal empirical paper of Trefler (1993) who notes that empirical 
research has found only a small impact of tariff reductions on trade flows. He suggests that it 
arises from treating trade barriers as exogenous. Trefler (1993) finds that when non-tariff 
barriers are treated as endogenous, the impact of NTBs on imports is 10 times higher. Ga-
wande (1999) finds evidence that governments do substitute higher levels of NTBs for a loss 
in tariff protection. A tariff cut by 10 % raises the price NTB coverage with 7% while the 
quantity NTB coverage would go up with 13.2%.  
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With particular reference to environmental regulations, Levinson and Taylor (2002) present 
a simple model with endogenous environmental policy and suggest an empirical strategy 
testing for the impact of regulations on trade flows. They estimate a simultaneous model 
similar to Trefler (1993) and show that when the environmental policy is treated as exoge-
nous it does not explain exports. However, when they treat abatement costs as endogenous, 
the ambiguity disappears and more stringent regulations lower net exports significantly.  
Similarly, Ederington and Minier (2003) carry out an exercise using imports from a cross-
section of all US manufacturing industries. The authors find that environmental regulations 
(measured as the share of abatement costs in total costs) have a significant but very minor 
effect on trade flows. A 1% change in costs raises import penetration by 0.53% points. In 
contrast, a three-stage least squares estimation (3SLS) which accounts for the endogeneity, 
yields an elasticity of 35. The authors also find evidence that environmental policy is being 
used as an indirect instrument for protecting industries since import penetration has a nega-
tive effect over environmental policy. This is consistent with the prediction that environ-
mental policy is responsive to pressures from increasing trade liberalization effects.  
Antweiler et al. (2001) study theoretically and empirically the effect of trade openness on 
pollution levels into scale, technique and composition effects. In their study, whereas all 
countries will set stricter environmental policies due to income and output increases follow-
ing trade liberalization, the total effect depends on factor endowments. The authors provide 
evidence that the overall trade openness has a negative impact on the pollution level.  
Fredericksson and Mani (2003) develop a testable theory of how environmental policy is af-
fected by the degree of trade integration and level of political turbulence in countries with 
high level of corruption. They test and empirically confirm the hypothesis that trade integra-
tion raises the stringency of environmental policy but that this effect disappears as the level 
of political uncertainty rises.  
4.  The Empirical Model 
In this section, we describe the specifications of the export equation and the domestic envi-
ronmental regulation equation taking into account the EU harmonization of environmental 
regulations. 
4.1. The  Export  Equation 
The empirical literature on testing the trade effects of the domestic environmental regula-
tions has mainly followed the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade, which is driven by  
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differences in factor endowments (for example, Tobey, 1990; Van Beers and van den Bergh, 
1997; Harris et al., 2002; Xu, 2000). Anderson (1979) and Bergstrand (1989, 1990) have 
theoretically validated the consistency of the gravity model with factor endowment differ-
ences. Helpman and Krugman (1985) have derived a gravity equation from a monopolistic 
competition framework while Deardorff (1995) complemented the Heckscher-Ohlin inter-
pretation with intra-industry from which a gravity model has been reconciled.
10  
Typically in a log-linear form, the model considers that the volume of trade is promoted by 
their economic size (income) and constrained by their geographic distances. Other charac-
teristics of counties can easily be added. For example, Frankel et al. (1995) add dummy 
variables for common language and common border. Deardorff (1995) argues that the rela-
tive distance of trading partners should also have an impact on the volume of trade. Wei 
(1996) and Helliwell (1997) extend this concept and define ‘remoteness variable’ that cap-
tures third country effects. 
To estimate the effect of environmental regulations on trade flows, we adapt a gravity speci-
fication that is similar to the model outlined in chapter 2. The specification has the following 
form:   
 x ijt = α + η cit + ν ADij +  β1 yit + β2 yjt  + ρ rijt + δ dij + λ rulcijt,+ εijt    , (1) 
with time,  t =  1, … T: xij  is the value of exports by country i to country j; yi is the level of 
income (GDP) in country i; yj is the level of income (GDP) in country j; dij is the distance 
between the trading centers of the two countries, ADij is a dummy variables to reflect the ef-
fects of adjacency (border) between i and j, and ci measures the share of the cost of environ-
mental protection (compliance with domestic environmental regulations) in production (of 
total manufacturing) of country i. All continuous variables are expressed in logarithms. 






















ij ln    , (2) 
where the remoteness of country i in relation to trading partner j is given as the ratio of the 
weighted distance between country i and country j divided by the weighted average distance 
                                                 
10  In a theoretical derivation of the gravity model, Deardorff (1995) relaxes the assumption that factor prices are 
equalized between countries, so that countries specialize in producing different goods. This highlights the 
key that is that countries produce different goods (not necessarily different ones); whether they do so because 




between country i and all trading partners other than j. The weights are given by the GDP of 
the trading partners. This new remoteness measure is expected to give a negative sign since 
for a given distance from other countries k, greater bilateral distance reduces trade while for 
a given bilateral distance, greater distance from other countries increases trade. 
Although generally ignored in the empirical gravity literature - with the exception of 
Bergstrand (1989) - the model should theoretically also take into account price competition 
because of the heterogeneous competition which characterizes trade flows. We include a 
measure of competitiveness based on the relative unit labor costs, rulcij, between the ex-
porting and importing countries, namely: 
 rulcij = (ulci/∑kωikulck) / (ulcj/∑kωjkulck) ,  (3) 
where ulci and ωik denotes respectively the unit labor cost of country i and the share of 
country k in total export (of manufacturing goods) of country i. We use the average bilateral 
trades during the period (1995-2000) as the weighting factor. A relative loss in the competi-
tiveness of the exporting country should decrease its exports.  
4.2.  The Domestic Environmental Regulation Equation 
It is feasible, for instance, that if exports were declining due to stringent environmental 
regulations, the reaction of the government may be to reduce the stringency of the regula-
tions to boost the trade competitiveness of these industries. In such a situation, it is necessary 
to estimate simultaneous equations, whereby the impact of regulations on net exports is es-
timated in a manner that controls for simultaneity between these two variables.  
An important feature we would like to investigate is whether the revealed synergy between 
the harmonization of EU environmental regulations and the level of the domestic environ-
mental protection may have impacted trade. To do so, we instrument the domestic environ-
mental protection variable with an EU policy variable that captures the harmonization of EU 
environmental regulations. We follow the empirical studies on endogenous protection in as-
suming that this function can be approximated by a linear regression. This function is written 
as:  
 c it = α + σ ijt s  + δ xijt + Z’θ + ηijt   , (4) 
where ci measures the domestic environmental regulations,  ij s  is a coverage ratio that is 
equal to the percentage of sectors that are covered by EU harmonization of environmental 
regulations and xij is the exports of manufacturing. Z’ is a set of additional variables that we  
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will motivate below. All variables, except for the coverage ratio, ij s , are expressed in loga-
rithms.  
In equation (4), a trade liberalization effect is separated out by two variables. Typically to 
the Single market, the instrument that presents the coverage ratio,  ij s , equals to the percent-
age of exports in manufacturing that aggregates all the sectors that are subjected to an elimi-
nation of so called technical barriers that may arise when they are differences in environ-
mental regulations across countries (see chapter 5 for the construction of this variable). This 
is the first instrument that accounts for a trade-liberalization effect in the Single market. A 
priori, we do not have an expected sign on σ. A negative sign would indicate that more har-
monized environmental regulations would reduce the level of environmental protection 
which is in support of the prediction of the theory of endogenous protection. In this context 
of EU environmental regulations, member countries may lower or substitute their own envi-
ronmental standards to, e.g. the lowest common denominator of an individual member state 
and still gain from the trade advantage of more harmonized environmental regulations. A 
second (standard) instrument that accounts for higher trade is exports, xij, and again, based 
on the literature of endogenous protection, we expect a negative correlation between exports 
and the level of domestic environmental protection (e.g. δ < 0 ). This variable is intended to 
capture higher exports that would occur for other non-accounted trade liberalization 
measures.   
Energy consumption (in industry), total investment (in tangible goods), lagged value-added 
(in manufacturing) and public expenditure of environmental protection (in manufacturing) 
are the other explanatory variables that we add in equation (4). It may well be that an in-
crease in energy consumption leads to an increase in CO2 emissions, which may lead to 
higher levels of domestic environmental protection aimed at innovative and environment-
friendlier activities. The impact of the public expenditure of environmental protection on in-
dustry expenditure depends partially on how this activity is organized within a country. For 
example, in the area of waste collection, which constitutes about 1/3 of the public sector 
spending, in some countries there is a tendency to privatize these activities. The other major 
part of the public spending includes regulation, control and surveillance which may be cor-
related with higher spending by the private industry. The data reveals that for CEEC coun-
tries the public sector expenditure is slightly above the EU average (as a percentage of 
GDP), which conforms to the context of enlargement and EU policies. We control for such 
differences between EU and CEEC countries in equation (4).   
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5. Econometric  Results 
5.1. Estimation   
Parallel to the search for a solid theoretical foundation, researchers have also investigated the 
econometric issues linked to the estimation of a gravity model. In a series of papers, Mátyás 
(1997, 1998), Egger (2000, 2001), and Cheng and Wall (1999) have used the advantages of 
panel techniques to test the trade determinants using the gravity equation. The pooled analy-
sis then concerns the possibility to capture a variation between three dimensions: a two di-
mensional effect between importing and exporting countries and a time dimension.  
With panel data it is not clear, at least a priori, if one should estimate a random or a fixed 
country effects model. Mátyás (1997) assumed that the effects were observable from the data 
and therefore adopted a fixed effect approach. However, the same author (Mátyás, 1998) 
noted that the choice between random or fixed effects is rather subjective and suggests using 
a random effect if the number of countries is large.  
In this paper, we estimate the gravity model using an iterated maximum likelihood version of 
the generalized least squares allowing for random effects (GLS-RE) in which we address the 
endogeneity by applying a two stage least squares allowing for random effects (2S-GLS-
RE). For the random effect, we decompose the error term in equation (1) in three unobserved 
components written as:  
  ijt j i ij ζ ν µ ε + + =    ,  (5)  
where µi and νj are the random unobserved effects of the exporting and importing country 
respectively (at a given time); and ξijt is a random component over countries and time.  
In general with the estimation of standard gravity models, an additional endogeneity concern 
arises between GDPs and exports since the error term, εijt, is presumably correlated with yi 
and yj. In all subsequent regression, we replace the predicted values of the GDPs (for each 
year and country) from a regression on several endowment measures that are used as instru-
ments. The set of instruments are (i) the GDPs from the two previous years - this should be 
sufficiently in capturing the variability from cyclical or temporary disturbances, (ii) current 
population, and (iii) gross capital formation from the current and two previous years. The re-
gression of the GDPs for each country is estimated between the periods: 1982-2000.   
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5.2. Results   
It is insightful to first compare our results to the general literature that estimated a gravity 
variant of equation (1) wherein the level of domestic environmental protection is treated as 
exogenous (Tobey, 1990; Van Beers and van den Bergh, 1997; Harris et al., 2002; Xu, 
2000). Next, we simultaneously estimate equation (1) and equation (4) to allow for the en-
dogeneity between exports and the level of domestic environmental protection, ci, using the 
2S-GLS-RE. Equation (1) tests the hypothesis that if domestic environmental policies, ci, are 
a source of reducing comparative advantage then its sign should be negative and significant 
while equation (4) extends the hypothesis that the level of domestic environmental protec-
tion may be reduced when exports increase. In equation (4), the sign of the coverage ratio of 
EU harmonized environmental regulations, ijt s , on the level of domestic environmental 
regulations is a priori not determined. As we have previously discussed, the effect of EU 
harmonization of environmental regulations may have a positive or negative effect on the 
level of the domestic environment regulations. To capture the asymmetry between EU and 
CEEC environmental regulations, we interact a CEEC (if country i = CEEC) dummy with 
some of the variables. Table 1 presents the results for the GLS-RE and the 2S-GLS-RE of 
equation (1). We also present the results of the first stage estimation of the domestic envi-
ronmental regulation equation (4). 
In the GLS-RE estimate of equation (1) reported in column (1), all the coefficients have the 
expected signs and the model has a high R
2 of .89. The core variables of the gravity model 
(GDPs, distance) are highly significant and yield results that are in line with
 previous litera-
ture studies. On average a 1% increase in distance reduces bilateral trade by 1.1% and is 
somewhat higher to previous studies where the consensus estimate is 0.6.
11 The other geo-
graphic variables (remoteness and adjacency) are also very significant with the expected 
signs. Exporting and importing countries that share the same border increase trade 1.18 (= 
exp (.17)) times while a 1% increase in the relative distance to other trading partners reduces 
exports with .65%. The strong significance of the relative unit labor costs indicates an im-
portant export price determinant. On average, a 1% increase in relative unit labor costs de-
creases exports with .37%. The coefficient of the domestic environmental regulation vari-
able, ci, is negative and statistically significant at the 1% confidence level. In contrast with 
previous literature that have employed a variant of the gravity equation we do find evidence 
                                                 
11  Chen (2004) suggests that reported distance coefficients that are much higher than the general agreed 0.6 
elasticity could be explained by the use of different transport modes. For example, in the European Union, in 
1998, 57.8% of total intra-EU trade went by road whereas most global trade is transported over sea.   
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that the cost of complying with domestic environmental regulations lowers exports and pro-
vides a source of comparative disadvantage. However, the estimate suggests that this effect 
is small. We are not aware of any other studies that have solely focused on the EU however 
some U.S. studies (Ederington and Minier, 2003; Robison, 1988) report elasticities between 
.5% and 1.3%. Our estimate implies that an increase of 1 percentage point in the level of 
domestic environmental regulations could expect exports to fall by .10 of a percentage point.   
In column (2), when we allow for a separate coefficient of the domestic environmental 
regulation variable for CEEC countries, we do not find any variation across the two country 
groups. The coefficient of the domestic environment regulation variable when the CEEC 
countries are exporters, ci*CEEC, deviates with only -.003 percentage points from an aver-
age coefficient of -.09 and is not significant. These results are somewhat surprising. For 
these countries, pressures and efforts at the domestic level to comply with the “green acquis” 
are much higher than current EU members. We therefore expected a much higher (negative) 
effect for the CEEC countries’ export performance.  
Next, as a second intermediate step before we report the simultaneous equation, we test for 
the endogeneity between the level of domestic and environmental protection using the 
Hausman (1978) specification test. From this test, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 
the level of domestic environmental protection is endogenous. We find strong evidence of 
endogeneity of the domestic environmental regulation variable, ci, at the 1% significance 
level (t-statistic = 2.65) suggesting that the 2S-GLS-RE against GLS-RE is more appropri-
ate. This result confirms the empirical work of Ederington and Minier (2003) who find that 
the level of domestic environmental protection and trade are indeed endogenous.   
In column (3-4), we report the results using the 2S-GLS-RE estimator where we treat the 
level of domestic environmental regulations endogenously. From column (3), we see that the 
coefficient estimate of the domestic environmental protection variable, ci, is now about 2 
times greater than its GLS-RE estimate.  The average estimate implies that an increase of 1 
percentage point in the expenditure of domestic environmental protection levels could expect 
exports to fall by .23 of a percentage point. The coefficient on the level of domestic envi-
ronment regulations when the CEEC countries are exporters, ci*CEEC is -.21 (-.23ci + 
.02ci*CEEC) and significant. This result is consistent with the work of Ederington and 
Minier (2003) who have found that when the level of domestic environmental regulations is 
modeled as endogenous, its impact on trade flows is much higher.   
 
88 
In column (4), we present the results of the environmental regulation regression (equation 4) 
from the simultaneous equation for the EU and CEEC country groups. In this paper, a crucial 
issue is the relationship between the harmonization of EU environmental regulations and 
domestic environmental protection. The net coefficient for the EU countries on the coverage 
ratio of EU harmonized regulations,  ijt s *EU, is -.32 and the net coefficient for the CEEC 
country groups,  ijt s *CEEC, is 1.04. An issue that emanates from this empirical finding is 
that more harmonization (the higher the share of exporting manufacturing sectors that are 
subject to EU environmental regulation) has led CEEC countries to increase their costs (in 
manufacturing) to protect their own environment while domestic environmental protection 
levels in EU countries have been lowered due to the harmonization of EU environmental 
regulations. The difference in coefficients between CEEC and EU countries suggests that the 
way the harmonization of environmental standards and domestic environmental protection 
has collided is far from symmetric between EU and CEEC countries.   
The coefficient estimate of export is positive and significant. It does not support the predic-
tion of the endogenous protection theory namely that domestic governments would tend to 
reduce the stringency of domestic environmental protection programs in order to increase the 
export competitiveness of these industries. This empirical finding suggests that there are 
some positive sides related to the implementation of domestic environmental regulations 
namely that a higher export performance to EU countries is not prioritized at the cost of the 
environment.  
The other variables that are significant in column (4) are energy consumption and public ex-
penditure in environmental protection. Specifically, we find that more consumption in en-
ergy leads to higher levels of environmental protection. For the CEEC countries, the coeffi-
cient of public expenditure in environmental protection is positive and suggests a (pro-
nounced) complementary effect that leads to more spending by the industry in protecting the 
environment. However, this effect is negative and not significant for the EU countries. Fi-
nally, the coefficients of investment and (lagged) value added have a positive and significant 
impact.  
6. Sensitivity  Analysis 
The results that we have obtained so far in our analysis are subject to greater doubt than the 
standard errors would suggest. Few studies have addressed the issue at the heart of this paper 
so that suitable comparisons by which to assess the robustness of the results presented here  
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are not available. Three important sources of doubt remain: outliers, estimator consistency 
and the choice of our instruments.  
6.1. Influential  observations 
The analysis of investigating the residuals, leverages and DFIT values reveals that there are a 
few problems with outliers. First we tested for DFITS values greater as the cut-off value 
suggested by Belsey, Kuh and Welsh (1980). These authors suggest that DFIT values greater 
than 2 times the square root of the number of variables divided by the number of observa-
tions deserve greater attention. Using this criterion we detected 9 observations in the total 
sample from which 6 observations are collided with the exports from Bulgaria to Greece 
while the other 3 observations were not centered on one particular country (Estonia – Den-
mark, Ireland –Greece, Poland-Germany). To proceed, we then expressed the residuals and 
leverage statistics in averages (with normalized standard deviations) and aggregated by ex-
porting country (for all years) and year (for all exporting countries). The aggregate residuals 
and leverage statistics did not reveal any inconsistencies among countries and time points 
except for the residuals of Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Poland and Sweden. Instead of 
deleting these observations one at a time and reporting the new results, we omitted all the 
observations contained in a single exporting country for all time periods.
12 As there are 6 
countries that deserve more attention, we performed 6 data adjustments, using the simulta-
neous specification reported in column (3-4) of Table 1. The results are encouraging. The 
coefficient of the domestic environmental regulation variable, ci, varies between -.18 and -
.27. When this is measured against the full sample estimate of -.23, it is clear that our esti-
mate is not sensitive to the omission of outliers.  
6.2.  Estimator Consistency  
As noted in the literature (Wooldridge, 2002), OLS estimates often violate their standard as-
sumptions of serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation when 
they are applied to panel. In a gravity framework, these assumptions may likely to be pre-
sent. For example, given the large differences between exports from different countries, het-
eroscedasticity is likely to occur and since the gravity specification includes characteristics 
(adjacency, distance) that are not interdependent over time, serial correlation is likely to be 
present. For this purpose, we performed some diagnostic tests.  
                                                 
12  Also note that the omission of a particular observation for one country at a given time would lead to changing 
values for the remoteness variable, Remij and Rulcij.  
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A series of Breusch-Pagan tests were carried out for different time periods. The null hy-
pothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected in most of the cases and the Jarque-Bera test rejects 
the null hypothesis of normality. We also test for first-order autocorrelation in the residuals. 
Using the first-order autoregressive process (AR1), there is very strong evidence of serial 
correlation.  
In a generalized least squares (GLS) model allowing for random effects, the problem of AR 
(1) errors, heteroscedasticity and contemporaneous correlation is exploited in the composite 
error term (Wooldridge, 2002).
13 In our estimation, this is equal to the ratio of the variance 
of µi and νj to the variance of the composite error (Wooldridge, 2002). In table 2, we reports 
details on the estimation of the variance components, which is generally regarded as a useful 
measure of the relative importance of unobserved effects. The variance components of the 




ν) are smaller than the variance of the 
idiosyncratic error (σ
2
ξ). Secondly, the variance of the exporting country is larger than the 
importing component. As expected, this result suggests that the variation between EU15 and 
CEEC countries should be larger than that among the EU15 countries.  
A possible drawback of the GLS estimator with random components applied to a gravity 
equation is that some of the explanatory variables in equation (1) may be correlated with the 
random unobserved effects of the exporting (µi) and importing country (νj). Especially, the 
time-invariant, geographical variables (distance, adjacency) may generate a possible correla-
tion with these unobserved effects. To verify the robustness of our results, we re-estimated 
equation (1) and (4) using our 2S-GLS-RE but in a Hausman-Taylor framework where we 
performed quasi-time demeaning on all the dependent variables, explanatory variables and 
the instruments.
14 The coefficient of the domestic environmental regulation variable, ci, is -
.27 while coefficients of the first stage regression (equation 4) remain robust. When we 
added the remoteness variable as a possible correlated variable with the random observed 
effects, ci increases to -.29. When this is measured against the full sample estimate of -.23 it 
is clear that our results are robust when correcting for a possible correlation between some of 
the explanatory variables and the random unobserved effects.  
                                                 
13  In the presence of an AR (1) process, the usual remedy is to include dynamics. We investigated a dynamic 
model and cannot reject co-integration. Subsequently, this requires a rigorous investigation, which we omit 
for the purpose of this paper. As such we feel that the use of the RE model is well suited for our analysis. 
14  We follow the procedure outlined in Wooldridge (2002) who discusses the application of a Hausman-Taylor 
approach applied to the estimation of simultaneous equations with a random component. To proceed, we 
quasi-time demeaned all variables in the system and we instrument (yi, yj, Remij, Rulij) on distance, adjacency. 
For the domestic environmental regulation variable, ci we use the instruments from equation (2).  
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6.3.  Exogeneity of the Instruments 
Although, our results supports the argument for treating the level of domestic environmental 
regulations as endogenous, misspecification of the environmental regulation equation may 
be biased due to contemporaneous correlation. To address this possibility, we follow Trefler 
(1993) and in table 2, we report estimates of the domestic environmental regulation variable, 
ci and ci*CEEC when each of the instruments is treated as an endogenous variable. In a 
2SLS estimation, this is equivalent to omitting the suspected variable from the list.  
From the table, it is suggested that the coefficient of ci is larger (and significant) except when 
we omit the public expenditure on domestic environmental protection. The Hausman test 
statistic comparing the results using all instruments to a subset is reported in the last column.  
The usefulness of this test statistic is that if we fail to reject the null hypothesis then we can 
have some confidence in the total set of instruments of the instruments. The over-identifica-
tion test statistics are not rejected at any reasonable level. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we found support for the prediction that the level of domestic environmental 
regulations has a larger negative effect on exports when they are treated as endogenous. The 
impact of domestic environmental regulations on exports is twice as large. A 1% change in 
costs of complying with domestic environmental regulations reduces exports by 0.10% 
points. In contrast, a 2SLS, which accounts for the endogeneity yields an elasticity of .23. 
These results must be interpreted with some form of caution since it is somewhat sensitive to 
the choice of instruments that have been used in the first stage regression. 
In our set of instruments we have also accounted for a specific variable that proxies an im-
portant aspect of the trade liberalization effect in the Single market namely, the harmoniza-
tion of environmental regulations. We provide evidence that domestic regulations will be 
relaxed in manufactures facing increasing trade liberalization, due to the harmonization of 
environmental regulations, for EU countries while CEEC countries set more stringent regu-
lations. This result is somewhat consistent with EU initiatives in environmental policy. On 
the other hands, the coefficient estimate of export that captures a more general liberalization 
effect is positive and significant. It does not support the prediction of the endogenous pro-
tection theory. It suggests that domestic governments would tend to reduce the stringency of 
domestic environmental protection programs in order to increase the export competitiveness 
of these industries. This empirical finding suggests that there are some positive sides related  
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to the implementation of domestic environmental regulations namely that a higher export 
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Notes: ci and ci*CEEC report the estimates of the domestic environmental regulations variable when the 
corresponding instrument is treated as endogenous in the system. Standard errors are in parentheses. In column 
(3) the Hausman test statistic is compared with the environmental regression estimated with the total set of 





In this chapter, we discuss and describe the data sources and methodology that have been 
used throughout the thesis. We also discuss some tables and graphs of the data. For each of 
the three chapters we distinguish between three categories of data: trade data, data on regu-
lations and other data. The data for chapter 2 and 3 are essentially the same while chapter 4 
employs a different data set.  
1. Trade  Data 
Trade data are taken from Eurostat (Comext Database) and are collected at the three digit 
NACE industrial classification (NACE70) which covers around 120 manufacturing indus-
tries. The data is available in values (euros) and volumes (tons).  
1.1.  Trade Data for Chapter 2 and 3 
The main features of the trade data set that is the subject of chapter 2 and 3 are:  
Variable: (i) chapter 2: imports of total manufacturing (ii) chapter 3: imports of manufac-
turing sectors that are subject to the various harmonization approaches used by the European 
Commission. (see section 2)  
Year: 1990-1998. 
Importers: 10 countries of the European Union including Denmark, France, Germany, 
Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.  
Exporters: 10 previous mentioned countries plus the remaining EU countries: Belgium-
Luxembourg (treated as one), Finland, Sweden and Austria.  
Deflator: We deflated the imports by an import unit price index using 1995 as the base year.  
1.2.  Trade Data for Chapter 4 
The main features of the trade data set that is the subject of chapter 4:  
Variable: exports of total manufacturing 
Year: 1995-2000. 
Exporter: (i) each of the 14 countries of the European Union including Austria, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands,  
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Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom, and (ii) the following Central and Eastern 
European countries (CEEC): Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and Ro-
mania.  
Imports: each of the 14 EU countries.  
Deflator: We deflated the exports by GDP using 1995 as a base year.  
2.  Data on Regulations 
In chapter 2 and 3, we merely focus on EU harmonized product regulations while in chapter 
4 we distinguish between domestic environmental regulations and EU harmonized environ-
mental regulations. We first describe some general quantification issues 
2.1.Data on EU Harmonized Product Regulations for Chapter 2 and 3 
Perhaps, the most important aspect of empirical work related to harmonization of technical 
regulations is its identification. It is difficult to measure the effect of removing technical bar-
riers to trade, and indeed, they have been characterized as “… one of the most difficult non-
tariff barriers imaginable to quantify” (Deardorff and Stern, 1997). This reflects in part 
problems relating to data and in many cases the impact of access to the Single Market has 
simply, and inadequately, been modeled as an ad hoc reduction in trade costs common 
across all suppliers.
1  
There are many reasons why such assumptions in a trade analysis could be flawed. However, 
technical regulations are not specified as some ex ante predictions. Rather, they are rules un-
der which inspection and conformity assessment will be adequately for market entry and the 
precise reduction in trade costs depend on the initial volume of trade. It is evident that in or-
der to develop useful evidence on the scope and consequences of harmonization of technical 
regulations for the EU, this requires a precise quantification and a comprehensive effort to 
analyze data at a level by sectors.  
For chapter 2 and 3, the data we use to identify harmonized technical regulations come from 
the detailed study undertaken for the Commission’s review of the impact of the Single Mar-
ket in the EU (CEC, 1998). This study provides information at the 3-digit level of the NACE 
classification of whether trade is affected by technical regulations and the dominant ap-
proach used by the Commission to the removal of such barriers in the EU. In the appendix of 
                                                 
1   For example, Gaisorek et al. (1991) and Brenton and Winters (1992) in different exercises assume that the 
completion of the Single Market implies a 2.5% reduction in trade costs for all EU members.   
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this chapter, Table 1 describes for each industry the dominant approach of the European 
Commission to the removal of technical barriers to trade.
2 
For sectors where technical regulations affect trade, the study classifies them as those where 
the barriers are overcome using mutual recognition, and those sectors where mutual recogni-
tion is insufficient or unsuitable so that either the old approach or the new approach to over-
coming technical barriers is used. There are; however, a small number of sectors where a 
combination of approaches is identified. We include these in the analysis.  
Two important issues emerge from the selection of this data. A first practical difficulty re-
lates to aggregation in characterizing the regulations (1) across countries and (2) within 
sectors. In the degree of information revelation of regulations facing sectors, it is assumed 
that for these sectors, all trade is affected by the technical regulations. However, using this 
data we avoid any other problem that may be related to an aggregation across countries since 
we do not have to deal with any country-specific methods of administration. It is evident that 
sampling techniques and requirements could vary by trading partner but since we are only 
considering EU regulations, these are uniformly spread across the EU and candidate CEEC 
countries, which allows us to make a comparable analysis. We, therefore, contend that this 
issue of aggregation may be addressed satisfactorily though our analysis that permits careful 
and detailed investigation on the scope and consequences of the harmonization of technical 
regulations within a particular sector and across countries.   
A second issue is the data adjustment that takes into account when a harmonization approach 
is applied to a particular NACE sectors. The CEC classification that assigns the harmoniza-
tion approach to each sector is based on a survey that was conducted in 1996. Since we are 
using data in a panel framework, we accordingly needed to adjust the data when they be-
came into effect. This is the case for only the category of sectors that regulated by the new 
approach and the category that comprises any combination with new approach products. The 
number of sectors that are regulated by old approach and mutual recognition are constant 
throughout 1990-1998.
3  
                                                 
2   See Chapter 3, for a detailed description of the various EU harmonization approaches.  
3     DG-Market acknowledges the assumption for keeping the old approach and mutual recognition sectors 
unchanged during this time period. For a complete list of when new approach products where introduced see 
“Directives and Related Standards”, Harmonization in the Single Market, published by CEN Management, 
(2000). This publication lists each directive in the new approach as well as the year the directive is applicable 
which is equivalent to when it is published.   
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We assume that the effect of a harmonized directive defined in the period t-1 affects the 
sector in time t. During the period 1990-1998, the most important change in new approach 
regulations occurred in 1993 with the introduction of the machine directive. The scope of 
manufacturing sectors that are affected by of other new harmonized regulations (lifts, gas 
appliances, low voltage equipment, etc.) were of minor importance in 1990, 1991, 1994 and 
1995. 
2.1.1.   The Quantification of EU Harmonized Regulations in Chapter 2 
In chapter 2, we quantify the incidence of EU harmonized regulations as an export coverage 
ratio that directly enters the gravity equation. The export coverage ratio is aggregated to the 
share of total manufacturing that are subject to any of the four harmonization approaches 
(mutual recognition, old approach, new approach and a combination of any of the ap-
proaches) and is applicable between exports of each of the 14 exporting countries to the EU 
as an aggregate.  
In our input data, the incidence of harmonization of regulations is signaled by an indicator 
variable, δijk, taking the value of 1 if any of a harmonization approach, l, is applied against 
trade of sector k between country i and country j. These indicators are aggregated to form 
coverage ratios, ij s , applicable between country i and j in total manufacturing. The aggregate 
coverage ratio is then defined as:  = ij s ∑k∈K wijk δijkL where δijkL=max (δijkl) and ∑k∈K wijk = 1. 
If the weights, wijk, are proportional to the level of bilateral trade between countries i and j, 
then these trade coverage ratios are equal to the percentage of sectors covered by the har-
monization of EU regulations.  
In chapter 2, we consider averaged exports between any country j and the EU aggregated as 
one region. For example, ideally, but unavailable set of weights, would be the level of pro-
duction. Using the imports as a weight would a worse approximation to the ideal average be-
cause the actual values of imports that are measured at the left hand side of the equation 
could be reflected by the presence of harmonization of technical regulations. The method we 
opted is to measure the coverage ratio of each country’s exports to the EU which is then 
based on a given set of reference countries which we defined as average EU. The construc-
tion of the reference countries is similarly to the coverage ratio of each country’s exports to 
the EU using intra-EU averaged exports 1990-1998.  
This share variable becomes time-variant by adjusting the share of exports accordingly to the 
time sectors became subject to the harmonization procedure (as we described in the previous  
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section). For example, the Machine Directive in 1993 affects the exports data in 1994 and is 
therefore not included in the coverage ratio for the previous years.  
2.1.2.   The Quantification of EU Harmonized Regulations in Chapter 3 
In chapter 3, we disaggregate the dependent variable, imports of manufacturing, into 6 cate-
gories: (i) new approach, (ii) old approach, (iii) mutual recognition, (iv) a combination of 
multiple approaches, (v) an aggregate of all harmonization approaches, and (vi) sectors 
where differences in national regulations do not constrain any trade flows.  
In table 2 (in the appendix), we show for 1998 for each country the share of EU imports in 
manufacturing that are (i) regulated by the different harmonization approaches: mutual rec-
ognition, old approach, new approach and a combination of any approach, (ii) regulated by 
an aggregate of the four types of harmonization approaches, and (iii) where technical 
barriers to trade do not apply.  
The share of manufacturing that is subject to the aggregate demonstrates that a very large 
proportion of intra-EU trade is in sectors affected by EU harmonized technical regulations.
4 
On average more than 75% of intra-EU imports are in sectors where differences in technical 
regulations are important. The share ranges from 59% for Greece to 85% for Ireland. 
The table demonstrates that there is a considerable variation across EU members in the share 
of trade affected by the different approaches to the removal of TBTs. For example, sectors 
where mutual recognition is used comprise a relatively large share of EU imports from Ire-
land (32%), Greece (30%) and Portugal (29%) but a small share of EU imports from Finland 
(5%) and Sweden (10%). Sectors characterized by the new approach comprise relatively 
larger shares of EU imports from Italy (20%), Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Germany (17%), 
but are less important from Greece (5%), Portugal, Ireland, Netherlands and Spain (8%). 
Sectors that are prone to the old approach comprise the largest share of total EU imports, 
relatively to the other approaches. It is of particular importance for Spain, Sweden and 
Finland (over 30%).  
This table concludes that the removal of technical regulations varies by the different ap-
proaches and by EU members and there is considerable variation across EU members in the 
share of trade affected by technical regulations. However, we also recognize that this share is 
                                                 
4   Previous analysis of the Single Market Program in the existing EU countries suggests that the removal of 
technical barriers to trade may be of great significance. CEC (1998) calculates that over 79% of total intra-
EU trade may have been affected by technical regulations in 1996. In the graph, we only consider 
manufacturing.   
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not only affected by differing national regulations but also by the level and composition of 
import volumes. 
2.2. Data on EU Harmonized Environmental Regulations for Chapter 4 
Since a partial focus in chapter 4 is the relationship between exports, the harmonization of 
EU environmental standards and domestic environmental protection, we need a reliable 
measure of the incidence of EU harmonized environmental regulations at the level of sec-
tors. The difference between EU harmonized product regulations and EU harmonization of 
environmental regulations is that the latter contains harmonized procedures that are product 
and process related.  
To measure the incidence of EU harmonized environmental regulations, we first utilize in-
formation coming from the detailed study undertaken for the Commission’s review of the 
impact of the Single Market in the EU (CEC, 1998). This study provides information at the 
3-digit level of the NACE classification of whether trade is affected by harmonized envi-
ronmental rules.
5 In our input data, the incidence is signaled by an indicator variable, δijk, 
taking the value of 1 if the harmonization approach is applied against the exports of sector k 
from country i to country j. These indicators are aggregated to form coverage ratios,  ij s , 
applicable from exporting country i to country j in total manufacturing. The aggregate 
coverage ratio is then defined as:  = ij s ∑k∈K wijk δijk where δijk=max (δijk) and ∑k∈K wijk = 1. If 
the weights, wijk, are proportional to the level of bilateral trade between countries i and j, then 
these coverage ratios are equal to the percentage of sectors covered by a harmonization ap-
proach. We follow Leamer (1983) and use home export-weighted coverage ratios for each of 
the exporting countries. The 3-digit sectors subjected to the EU harmonization of environ-
mental regulations are summarized in table 3 in the appendix. We note that the EU harmo-
nized environmental regulations that have been considered in this chapter all have been in-
troduced before 1995.  
In figure 1, we compare the weighted coverage ratios of sectors that are subject to EU har-
monized environmental regulations for each of the EU and CEEC exporting countries to the 
EU in the year 1995 and 2000. This figure illustrates that on average about 30% of intra-EU 
imports are in sectors where EU harmonized environmental regulations are important.  
For the current EU member countries, the significance of these sectors ranges from around 
20% of EU imports from Greece and Portugal to 35% of EU imports from Finland, 
                                                 
5   In addition to the information that contains the EU harmonization approach.   
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Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden and the UK. When comparing year 1995 
with year 2000, except for Belgium (and Luxembourg.), Spain and Italy, in all other cases 
the shares of these sectors have fallen in a range between 0.1% for Ireland and the most no-
table change in a share of 10% for Finland. For the CEEC countries, with the exception of 
Bulgaria, the share of sectors remained fairly constant, ranging from around 7% for Romania 
to 20% for Hungary, Poland and Slovakia and for 25% for the Czech Republic and Slovenia.  
The principal conclusion to be drawn from this figure is the overall importance of harmo-
nized environmental regulations to trade between EU and CEEC countries. In addition, there 
is a variation across countries in the share affected to the harmonization of environmental 
regulations caused by differing national regulations. Between 1995 and 2000, the share of 
these sectors changed little over this period despite the increasing efforts of the EU in har-
monizing the environmental standards or neutralizing inter-country differences in environ-
mental regulations. Yet it would have been expected that these shares would have increased 
since the advantage of the harmonization of environmental standards is that it can remove 
trade impediments arising from differences in environmental standards. The fact that the 
share of exports that are not subject to harmonized regulations has increased may be attrib-
uted to the fact that there is a change in the trade composition. The data reveals that within 
an average of 30% of exports, several sectors are highly sensitive to fluctuations. It may also 
well be that a comparison between any other two years may reveal a different picture. 
2.3.  Data on Domestic Environmental Protection for Chapter 4 
In order to calculate the compliance cost with domestic environmental regulations, we use an 
indicator of the economic resources spent on environmental protection in total manufactur-
ing for each reported country between the periods 1995-2000. The data on the domestic en-
vironmental protection in total manufacturing comprises of an aggregate of different indus-
tries that are also available from Eurostat. (New Cronos/yearly statistical Eurostat publica-
tions; see footnote of table 5 in the appendix). We were unable to use data at the industry 
level because there were many missing observations at the industry level for the period be-
fore 2000. In the appendix, table 4 shows the level of environmental protection for each 
country and year. These data are available for both the industry and public sector and are 
listed in the appendix, table 4-5 by country and year.  
We are aware that this is not an entire cost in alignment with the domestic environmental 
regulations since we are not including institutional and administrative costs. For the purpose 
of our study, the costs that we are capturing are directly related to the production process as  
 
102 
well as those costs that serve to abate the pollution stemming from the production process. 
The environmental protection expenditure is classified in different activities according to the 
Single European Standard Statistical Classification of Environmental Protection Activities 
(CEPA) broken down in the following groups: water & soil, industrial pollution, air, noise, 
nature and forestry protection, as well as chemical substances and genetically modified or-
ganisms. These activities are aggregated due to missing observations 
We rely on two sources. Wherever possible, we use data on the ‘industry expenditure on en-
vironmental protection’ from Eurostat (New Cronos). When the data are unavailable, we fill 
in missing observations with comparables from the various institutes of statistics This has 
been the case for Sweden, Austria, Czech Republic, and Ireland. To measure the expenditure 
on domestic environmental protection in total manufacturing, we deflate this variable by the 
GDP deflator using 1995 as the base. 
3. Other  Data 
3.1.  Other Data for Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 
In Chapter 2 and 3, we add a number of other variables that are necessary to estimate the 
gravity model. Internal distances dii, are taken from Nitsch (2000), which were calculated by 
using the disk area procedure to obtain the average distance between economic centers. He 
shows that the radius of a circle (given by the inverse of the square root of π times the square 
root of the area) may be a good approximation for the average distance. For distances be-
tween countries dij, we follow the conventional method in the gravity literature and measure 
the direct (great circle) distance between the economic centers (capital cities). Table 6 in the 
appendix lists the bilateral distances in kilometers, the internal distances within each country 
as well as the area in kilometers of each EU member country.  
This paper requires bilateral trade and production data in a compatible classification for 10 
European countries over the period 1990-1998. Since we do not have any data on national 
trade, we follow Wei’s (1996) methodology based upon the assumption that for any country 
i, domestic trade (imports from itself) is defined as the difference between its production and 
exports.
6 We extracted production data from New Cronos with reference to the domain of 
the 'business structural database'. The long time series, “covering enterprises with 20 persons 
employed and more”, in NACE revision 1 (code at 3 digit level) were converted to NACE70 
                                                 
6   This definition has become the standard methodology for empirical studies that can not rely on national data , 
see for example: Helliwell 1997, 1998, for OECD countries; Nitsch, 2000, Chen, 2004 for EU countries.     
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(code at 3 digit level) in order to match with trade data extracted from Eurostat (Comext) 
database. The concordance lists the NACE revision 1 and the NACE70 at a 5 and 4 digit 
level code, respectively. Some in-between-year observations are missing from the New 
Cronos database. Missing data, then, are approximated by applying a trend of the gross rate 
of value-added (in quantity) in each NACE sector. Finally, Gross Capital Formation (1995 
Prices) GDP (1995 Prices), Unit Labor Costs (1995 Prices) and population are obtained from 
the New Cronos database. For the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, some missing values of 
unit labor costs were unavailable. For these countries, we approximated these missing obser-
vations using labor cost indexes that were computed by the European Commission (DG-
ECOFIN). The series can be downloaded from ECODATA (available from the Belgian 
Ministry of Economic Affairs, http://ecodata.mineco.fgov.be). 
In Table 7 in the appendix, we give the GDP per capita and its growth rate for each import-
ing country.  
3.2.  Other Data for Chapter 4 
Distance between countries is measured as the great circle distance between the national 
capitals. Value added (at factor cost) in total manufacturing, production in total manufactur-
ing (1995 prices), gross investment (in tangible goods), gross capital formation (1995 
Prices), GDP in current and constant prices (1995), population, energy consumption (in in-
dustry) and unit labor costs (constant) in total manufacturing are obtained from the Eurostat 
(New Cronos) database. For some of the variables that were not available in nominal terms 
(value-added, gross investment, energy consumption), we deflate this variable by the GDP 
deflator, using 1995 as the base. For the Netherlands, Denmark and Spain, some missing 
values of unit labor costs were unavailable. For these countries we approximated these 
missing observations using labor cost indexes that were computed by the European Commis-
sion (DG-ECOFIN). The series can be downloaded from ECODATA (available from the 






Table 1: NACE Sectors regulated by different Harmonization Approaches 
NACE  Mutual recognition 
sectors 
 
NACE  New Approach Sectors 
1200 Coke  ovens  2210  Iron and steel  
1300  Extr. of petroleum and 
natural gas 
2240 NF  materials   
2310  Extraction of building 
material  
2410  Clay products for constr. 
Purposes 





2550 Paint,  varnishing, 
printing ink 
3140  Structural metal products 
2600  Man-made fibers  3150  Boilers, reservoirs, tanks 
3166 Manufacture  of  metal 
furniture 
3165  Domestic heating appliances 
3610 Shipbuilding  3210  Agricultural  mach.  Tractors 
3620  Manuf of railway rol. 
Stock 
3220  Machine tools working metal 
3640  Aerospace equipment  3230  Textile machines, sewing  
3650 Other  transport. 
equipment 
3240  Machines for food and chem. 
Industry 
4110  Manufacture of oils and 
fats 
3250  Machines for iron and steel 
4240  Ethyl alcohol, spirit dist.  3260  Transmission equipment 
4250  Wine of fresh grapes, 
cider 
3270  Equipm. For use in spec. 
branches 
4270  Brewing and malting   3280  Other mach.&equip. 
4280  Soft drinks   3720  Medical and surg. Equipment 
4340  Prep. Of flax, hemp, 
ramie 
4620 Semi-finished  goods 
4360 Knitting  industry    4630  Carpentry 
4370  Textile finishing   4910  Manuf. of articles of jewelry 
4390 Misc.  textiles     
4530  Manuf. of clothing      
4550  Manuf. of household 
textiles 
  




Table 1 (continued)  
NACE  Old approach  NACE  No Regulations 
  
1100  Extraction of solid fuels  1600  Electr., gas, steam 
1400  Mineral oil refining   2110  Extr. Prep. of ore 
1510  Extr. Nuclear materials  2120  Extr. Prep. of non-fer met. Ores 
1520 Production  of  nuclear 
materials 
2220  Man. of steel tubes 
1700  Water supply  2230  Draw. Cold rolling of steel 
2440  Manuf. of arts & 
asbestos 
2320 Salt 
2560  Chem. Prod  2450  Work of stones 
2570  Pharm. products  2460  Grind, abras. prod. 
2580  Soap, detergents  2480  Man. of ceramics 
3450  Manuf. of radios & tv  2590  Man. of other chem.. prod. 
3510  Manuf. of ass. Motor 
vehicles 
311-313  Foundries, pressing, treat. of 
metal 
3530  Man. Parts for motor 
vehicles 
3160  Tools and finished goods 
3630  Manuf. of (motor) cycles  3300  Office mach. 
4120  Prep. of meat  3410  Wires & cables 
4130  Manuf of dairy products  3520  Bodies for motor vehicles 
4140  Proc. of fruit and 
vegetables 
3710  Meas.& prec. instr. 
4150  Proc. Preserv. of fish  3730  Optic. instr. 
4160  Grain milling   3740  Man. of watches 
4170  Man. of spaghetti  4310  Wool industry 
4180  Starch and starch 
products 
4320  Cotton industry  
4190  Bread and flour  4330  Silk industry 
4210  Cocoa and sugar conf.   4350  Jute industry  
4220  Animal and poultry food   4410  Tanning; dressing of leather 
4230  Man. of other food prod.  4420  Leather products 
4290 Tobacco  products  4510  Footwear 
4710  Manuf. of pulp and 
paper 
4610  Sawing and proc. of wood  
4720  Proc. of paper and board  4640  Man of wooden containers 
4740  Publishing   4650  Other wood. man. 
    4660  Art. of cork 
    4730  Printing and allied industries 
    4810  Man. of rubber products 
   4820  Rubber  tires 
    4920  Musical instr.  
   4930  Photograph 
    4950  Misc. manuf. ind.  
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Table 1 (continued) 
NACE  Combination of Harmonization Approaches 
 
2210  Iron & steel  MRP + NA 
2470  Man. of glass  OA + NA 
3440  Man. of telec. equipm  MRP + NA 
3460  Domestic electr. appl.  MRP + NA 
3470  Man. of electr. lamps  MRP + NA 
4110  Man. of oils & fats  OA + MRP 
4380  Carpets  MRP + NA 
4830  Construction products  OA + MRP + NA 
4940  Toys   MRP + NA 
 
Table 2: The Importance of the Harmonization Approaches to Technical Regulations: 
Coverage of EU (15) Imports from Member in 1998, % 













EU Imports from Member States 
Austria 26.29 17.97  11.40 15.08  70.74  29.26 
Bel-Lux 30.03  10.62  13.74  19.25  73.64  26.36 
Denmark 24.98  17.39  16.54  13.95 72.86  27.14 
Finland 38.89  12.20  5.04  22.34  78.47  21.53 
France 30.74 11.12  17.32  14.14  73.32 26.68 
Germany 31.12  17.53  14.70  16.47 79.82  20.18 
Greece 17.28  5.60  29.65 6.72  59.25  40.75 
Ireland 22.06  9.45  32.34  20.73  84.58  15.42 
Italy 17.98  20.90  17.84  15.78  72.5  27.50 
Neths 27.17  7.95 22.22  17.71  75.05  24.95 
Portugal 25.32  8.92  28.78  10.05  73.07  26.93 
Spain 39.73  8.86 11.31  11.26  71.16  28.84 
Sweden 33.91  16.43  10.45 18.21 79  21.00 
UK 21.29  14.08  24.61  16.71  76.69  23.31 




Table 3: Sectors subject to EU Harmonization of Environmental Regulations 
NACE      








Machines and equipment 
151-152  Extract. & prod. of 
nuclear materials 
342  Manuf. of electrical machinery 
244  Manuf. of art. Asbestos  343  Electr. apparatus for industrial 
use 
245  Work. of stones & non-
met. prod.  
347  Manuf. electr. lamps 
247  Manuf. of glass & 
glassware  
351 Manuf.  motor  vehicles 
251-259  Basic industry chem, 
petrochem., pharm.  
363  Man. of cycles, motor cycles 
314  Structural metal products  411-419   Food products 
315  Boilers, reservoirs, tanks  471-472  pulp and paper 
316 Domestic  heating 
appliances 
 
481-482 Rubber  products 
      
Figure 1: Coverage ratio of Sectors subject to EU Harmonized 






















































































































































































Table 4: Environmental Protection Expenditure by Industry in Total Manufacturing (in 
millions of euro) 
       
   2000  1999 1998 1997 1996  1995 
            
Austria   1148.7  1141.4 1208.0 1317.7 1229.5  1208.7 
Belgium   1152.4  1164.8 1064.8 1243.5 1058.1  1286.7 
Denmark  541.3  490.2 525.1 554.0 577.4 535.4 
Finland   321.3  331.2 241.1 509.0 455.4  435.4 
France   9980.0  9980.0 9981.8 9661.7 9221.9  8876.2 
Germany   9660.2 9660.2 12067.5 12780.8 9222.0  9350.0 
Greece   287.6  283.0 260.9 232.5 281.1  241.7 
Ireland   197.6  184.4 165.9 152.5 137.4  127.1 
Italy   1480.6  1439.3 1416.7 1391.7 1364.1  1349.3 
Netherlands 1675.5  1662.2 1269.1 1392.6 1415.2  1543.2 
Portugal   443.7 339.7 261.1 179.9 219.0  178.1 
Spain   1454.6  999.8 823.8 680.6 667.8  655.1 
Sweden   973.0 843.3 909.1 974.8 965.1  955.4 
United 
Kingdom 6930.5  6029.7 6087.6 6175.0 5434.0  4781.9 
            
Bulgaria   151.0 162.0 102.0 68.0 61.0  60.0 
Czech 
Republic  1057.2 1023.9 1019.1 1029.8 1037.8  995.1 
Estonia  44.1 48.1 56.5 56.5 315.8 6.2 
Hungary   526.5 524.3 480.5 458.5 438.2  432.4 
Poland   2497.1  2401.5 2675.0 2368.0 2217.0  691.0 
Romania  298.0  384.1 460.8 358.7 309.1  275.1 
Slovak 
Republic  189.9 248.7 504.5 502.9 477.6  451.2 




Table 5: Total Environmental Protection Expenditure by Public Sector (in millions of euro) 
      
    2000 1999 1998 1997  1996  1995 
           
Austria   349.3  352.5 483.7 358.0 2415.8  2637.4 
Belgium   1266.0  1113.4 1148.9 973.4 928.5  950.1 
Denmark  2188.2 2100.3 1946.3 1881.3 1870.2 1768.2 
Finland   509.3 480.8 519.8 537.5 528.5  542.5 
France   12617.1  11650.0 10900.6 10428.4 10071.2  9307.9 
Germany   10007.8  10108.2 10395.4 11219.8 13003.1  14644.4 
Greece   722.5 729.8 702.4 681.3 664.7  564.9 
Ireland   403.5  407.6 411.7 415.8 420.0  424.2 
Italy   8592.0  8032.0 7527.0 7013.0 6587.0  5356.7 
Netherlands 3950.9  3990.8 4031.1 4071.9 4546.7  4592.6 
Portugal  729.0  665.2 627.5 774.8 753.7  682.3 
Spain   4227.0  4269.6 3885.8 3551.7 3355.7  3664.9 
Sweden  542.6  359.2 381.3 190.3 352.81  356.3 
United 
Kingdom 7576.3  6624.3 5966.8 5541.5 5597.0  5652.9 
           
Bulgaria   43.1  51.6 25.4 10.0 9.0  13.6 
Czech 
Republic  296.8 299.8 313.4 376.8 369.8  316.5 
Estonia   16.7  10.8 11.2 8.6 9.3  25.8 
Hungary  216.8  219 92 92.2 93.4  94.7 
Poland   1408.9  1314.6 1313.7 744.1 654.3  307.8 
Romania   63.2  130.7 193.6 159.2 135.1  114.4 
Slovenia   35.5  29.8 24.9 22.1 18.8 18.7 
Slovak 
Republic  30.5 136.8 82.3 69.8 70.9  73.4 
Additional Sources for Table 4 and 5 
Eurostat Sources: (i) New Cronos (ii) Environmental Protection Expenditure by Industry. Statistics in Focus 
(2001, 2002, 2003) (iii) Environmental Protection Expenditure in Accession Countries: Data: 1996-2000. 
Eurostat (2002). (iv) Environmental Expenditure Accounts: Results of Pilot Applications (vi) For Sweden, 
Austria, Czech Republic, Hungary and Ireland, missing data has been appended with comparables for their 




Table 6: Bilateral and Internal Distances 
International 
Distances: dij                   
  Belgium Denmark Germany Greece Spain France Ireland  Italy Netherl. Portugal UK
Belgium-L   769  319 2092 1316 262 776  1173 174 1712 320
Denmark 769   671 2136 2075 1029 1243  1531 623 2481 958
Germany 319  671    1802 1447 479 1088  960 365 1892 635
Greece  2092 2136 1802   2374 2101 2859  1054 2164 2859 2394
Spain  1316 2075 1447 2374   1054 1451  1365 1482 504 1264
France 262  1029  479 2101 1054   779  1108 428 1454 341
Ireland  776 1243 1088 2859 1451 779   1887 760 1640 464
Italy 1173  1531  960 1054 1365 1108 1887    1294 1866 1434
Netherlands  174 623 365 2164 1482 428 760  1294   1864 359
Portugal  1712 2481 1892 2859 504 1454 1640  1866 1864   1585
UK  320 958 635 2394 1264 341 464  1434 359 1585  
                   
                   
  Area    dii             
  1000 km2                 
Belg./Lux  33.1    4.6313             
Danmark 43.1    4.763              
Deutschland  248.7    5.6397             
Ellas  132.0    5.3228             
Espana  504.8    5.9936             
France  544.0    6.031              
Ireland 68.9    4.9978             
Italia  301.3    5.7355             
Nederland  41.0    4.7384             
Portugal  92.0    5.1422             
United  Kingdom 244.1    5.6303             
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Table 7: GDP per Capita by Importing Country  
  GDP per 
Capita (Yci) 
Growth Rate 
of GDP per 
Capita (Yc)  
Denmark  1.49 0.023  (0.001) 
France  1.13 0.016  (0.002) 
Germany  1.30 0.010  (0.001) 
Greece  0.48 0.021  (0.003) 
Italy  0.82 0.016  (0.001) 
Ireland  0.79 0.077  (0.003) 
Netherlands  1.16 0.026  (0.001) 
Portugal  0.46 0.029  (0.002) 
Spain  0.64 0.028  (0.002) 
United 
Kingdom 
0.83 0.026  (0.0006) 
   
Notes: In column (2), the growth rate of the GDP per capita for each importing country is approximated 









In this thesis, we analyzed the impact of EU harmonized regulations on bilateral trade 
flows of the manufacturing sector in Europe. We distinguished between two types of 
EU regulations. In chapter 2 and 3 we dealt with product-specific regulations while 
chapter 4 looked at environmental regulations both at the EU and at the level of EU 
member and non-member states.  
The data on EU regulations comes from the European Commission’s review of the im-
pact of the Single Market in the EU. This study provides information at the 3-digit 
level of the NACE classification of whether trade is affected by technical regulations 
and the dominant approach used by the Commission to the removal of such barriers in 
the EU. One of the important features of this data is that it has enabled us to study the 
impact of EU regulations across countries, between groups of manufacturing sectors 
and, through our own efforts, across time.  
A central feature that has contributed to a better understanding of the situation of EU 
harmonized regulations and trade flows has been the particular attention given to the 
functional form of the gravity model of international trade. The theoretical and empiri-
cal research devoted to the gravity model remains somewhat unclear: assumptions 
needed to derive the gravity equation are not well understood, econometric suggestions 
are somewhat mixed and sometimes a-theoretical variables are included.  
In this study, we have made an attempt to provide some further insights in trying to 
understand the gravity equation. We developed and selected a specification of the 
gravity model based on some economic and econometric refinements that have been 
tested in a panel framework of EU bilateral trade of manufacturing at different levels 
of aggregation. The gravity model in chapters 2 and 3 is specified as an importing de-
mand specification applied to various types of aggregation in manufacturing including 
the total manufacturing sector. In chapter 4, the gravity model is expressed as an ex-
porting supply equation applied to total manufacturing. 
The estimation results are in general well reconciled with the prediction of the model. 
The coefficient of the core variables of the gravity model, namely income, distance and 
relative distances (remoteness), all have the expected signs and are statistically 
significant. Trade between two countries are promoted by the incomes of the trading 
partners and constrained by their bilateral distance. In this study, we define remoteness  
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in relative terms and is expected to enter the gravity equation with a negative sign. It is 
interpreted as follows: for a given distance from other countries, greater bilateral dis-
tance between bilateral trading partners reduces trade while for a given bilateral dis-
tance, greater distance from other countries increases trade. 
For the importing demand equation, we introduced a variable that captures a more 
flexible income response that is usually implied by a standard gravity equation. More 
specifically, our estimation shows that the assumption of constant income elasticities is 
empirically not validated. We find that as income of the domestic country increases the 
share of manufacturing goods has a declining income elasticity. These elasticities are 
statistically significant and vary according to different levels of aggregation in the 
manufacturing sector. 
In addition, we introduce a general and a specific, bilateral measure of competitiveness 
that plays an important feature to intra-EU trade. In the importing equation, we intro-
duce both measures of competitiveness while in the exporting equation we only in-
clude the specific, bilateral measure of competitiveness. A more general effect for 
competitiveness, that is domestic inflation with respect to foreign price competition, 
measured by an import unit price index, is found to have a significant and positive im-
pact on imports while a specific measure of competitiveness, based on relative unit la-
bor costs, also increases imports. The coefficients of these two variables are found to 
be statistically significant at all types of aggregation in the manufacturing sector. In the 
export equation, we find that relative unit labor costs have a negative impact on ex-
ports. The expected signs are also significant.  
In this study, we have also provided some further insights in the econometric analysis 
of the gravity model applied to a panel dataset. A particular attention has been given to 
an appropriate choice of the deflator, to the estimation method, to tests of the restric-
tion of variables of interest and to other various statistical inferences.  
The impact of the EU harmonization of regulations is explored in two applications of 
the gravity model. In chapter 2 and 3, we examine how EU harmonization of technical 
regulations has affected the pattern of bilateral trade flows taking into account the 
downward impact of national border on trade flows. Our findings are:  
(i)  Harmonization of technical regulations has a positive and significant impact 
on imports in total manufacturing. We find that, between 1990 and 1998, the  
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share of sectors regulated by harmonization in total manufacturing increases 
imports with a factor of 10. 
(ii)  When we separate out the effect of the harmonization of technical regula-
tions on domestic trade in total manufacturing, we find that harmonization 
cannot explain the presence of border effects. 
(iii)  Harmonization of regulations can not explain the variability of border ef-
fects between manufacturing sectors regulated by EU harmonization and 
manufacturing sectors where technical barriers to trade do not apply. In ad-
dition, we find that the presence of large border effects found in each of 
these two sectors do not exhibit any declining trend. 
(iv)  We find that sectors where harmonization of regulations is of minor impor-
tance, mutual recognition, exhibit small border effects. Old approach sectors 
where there have been substantial efforts to remove regulatory barriers to 
trade still reflect large border effects. In addition, the border effects of these 
sectors have remained constant over time. New approach sectors where 
harmonization of regulations is less complicated exhibit an increasing trend 
of cross-border integration.  
In chapter 4, we study the link between environmental regulations and exports with 
particular reference to the Single Market and enlargement. We incorporate the meth-
odology of endogenous protection and question whether countries may wish to weaken 
their environmental policies as a response to harmonized environmental regulations. 
The results find support for the prediction that the level of domestic environmental 
regulations has a large negative effect on exports. The impact of domestic environ-
mental regulations on exports is twice as large when it is treated as an endogenous 
variable. A further issue that emanates from this empirical finding is that more har-
monization (the higher the share of exporting manufacturing sectors that are subject to 
EU environmental regulation) has been accompanied by more stringent domestic envi-
ronmental regulations in Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC) and lower 
levels of domestic environmental regulations in EU countries. In addition, we find that 
countries will not reduce the level of domestic environmental regulations as a response 
to more exports.  
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This study distinguishes itself from others in the literature by explicitly dealing with 
the harmonization of regulations at the EU level and its unique methodology in under-
standing the various determinants of European trade. However, a more in-depth and 
sophisticated study requires further research in several areas. First of all, one of the 
shortcomings is that the data on EU regulations are only available at a 3-digit NACE 
level of sectors. It is desirable to look at a more detailed level of products that are cov-
ered by relevant harmonization initiatives of technical regulations. Second, the gravity 
model that we have used is static. However, there are economic arguments that suggest 
that trade is a dynamic process. Finally, in the context of EU harmonization of regula-
tions, the scope of our investigation dealing with solely European countries should be 
expanded to non-EU countries. This should enable us to identify important aspects of 
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